Convention in Joint Activity by Richard Alterman & Andrew Garland
           
Convention in Joint Activity¤
Richard Alterman
Andrew Garland
Computer Science Department
Volen Center for Complex Systems
Brandeis University
Waltham, MA 02254
falterman,aegg@cs.brandeis.edu
Technical Report: CS-98-199
Revised March, 2000.
Abstract
Conventional behaviors develop from practice for regularly occurring problems of
coordination within a community of actors. Re-using and extending conventional meth-
ods for coordinating behavior is the task of everyday reasoning.
The computational model presented in the paper details the emergence of conven-
tion in circumstances where there is no ruling body of knowledge developed by prior
generations of actors within the community to guide behavior. The framework we as-
sume combines social theories of cognition with human information processing models
that have been developed within Cognitive Science. The model presented re°ects both
elements of the framework. Conventional behaviors are partially coded in the predis-
position of participants in a joint activity to expect certain points of coordination to
develop during the course of the activity. The expected points of coordination that are
commonly assumed form a design for an activity. Because of uncertainty, interruptions,
and numerous other opportunities to get o®-track and out-of-synch, the participants
must work jointly and continuously to achieve conventional coordination.
One feature of the model is that the community improves its performance despite
the fact that individual actors reason independently about their experiences. Another
important feature of the model is that the mechanisms for improving behavior are tied
to the memory function of individual actors. A third important feature is that the
social interaction among the participants simpli¯es and drives the everyday reason-
ing processes. An analysis of a large set of computational experiments supports the
theoretical position that is developed regarding everyday reasoning and convention.
¤The authors would like to acknowledge the following people for their comments on an earlier draft of this
paper: James Greeno, Edwin Hutchins and two anonymous reviewers. This work was supported by ONR
(N00014-96-1-0440). Additional funding was provided by NSF (ISI-9634102).
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1 Introduction
Most everyday behavior is done jointly with another actor. Performance depends on coop-
eration and coordination among the participating actors. Conventional behaviors develop
for recurrent problems of coordination within a community of actors, reducing the e®ort and
work required to coordinate.
One example of a coordinated behavior that has its basis in convention is crossing a road
at an intersection either by car, by bicycle, or by foot. Participants in this situation are
informed by a large set of conventions concerning diverse things such as crosswalk markings,
multiple cars approaching a stop sign, ordering preferences between turning cars, di®ering
con¯gurations of merging tra±c (T-intersections and Y-merging thoroughfares) and types of
roads (highways and residential streets, or one-way and two-way roads), ages and capabilities
of pedestrians and drivers, et cetera. Deciding which of these policies are in force requires
coordination between individuals, and conventions also exist for making that decision. Any
sort of stereotypical situation for which a script could be generated to represent the coor-
dination of behavior between participants is also a case where convention is at work, e.g.,
subway stations, restaurants, buses, and the supermarket checkout. Using devices, tools,
and artifacts is primarily reasoning about convention. Communication, in any of its forms,
is tied to conventions of use.
Re-using and extending conventional methods for coordinating behavior is the task of
everyday reasoning and the subject of this paper. The framework we assume combines social
theories of cognition with human information processing models that have been developed
within Cognitive Science. Within Cognitive Science, this framework for studying cognition
has been explicitly argued for by Hutchins (1995ab) and Greeno (1998). The foundations
of the social theories we assume include the works of Mead (1934) on cognition as a social
act, the Soviet cultural and historic models of cognition (Vygotsky, 1978; 1986) and their
American counterparts (Cole, 1996), and recent work that assumes activity and interaction
(Suchman, 1987; Lave, 1988; Agre, 1997) | instead of cognitive structure | as the basic
unit of analysis in the study of cognition. The tradition of research on human information
processing we assume originates with the work on human problem solving of Newell & Simon
(1972). Within that tradition, Arti¯cial Intelligence models of planning that began with the
work on STRIPS (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971) and models of reasoning that are tied to memory
or cases (Schank, 1982; Kolodner, 1993) are most directly relevant, especially the work on
adaptive planning (Alterman, 1988) and everyday reasoning as pragmatic action (Alterman,
Zito-Wolf, and Carpenter, 1998; Alterman, 1999). Also of direct relevance is cognitive work
on the design of everyday things (Norman, 1988).
The model we present re°ects both elements of the uni¯ed cognitive science and social
theory framework. From the perspective of individual psychology:
² Reasoning about everyday joint behavior is a memory-based process tied to pragmatic
action. The predisposition for certain points of coordination to develop during the
course of activity, and the assumption that other actors will share those predispositions,
frame the individual's behavior.
From the perspective of a social theory of cognition:
3     
² The social interaction among participants circumscribes and simpli¯es the reasoning
processes. The participants agree to points of coordination as they proceed. The
historic elements of the social interaction between actors within a community cannot
be factored out of the analysis of conventional behavior.
Crossing the street at a busy intersection exempli¯es each of these features of the model.
The reasoning of pedestrians, cyclists, and drivers alike depends on the ongoing social in-
teraction within the community. Eye contact, and other forms of communication, reduce a
participant's e®ort in interpreting the actions of other actors. Reasoning in the situation
depends on familiarity with the behaviors, types of drivers (e.g., taxi drivers or school bus
drivers), and how they reason about crosswalks and yellow lights (artifacts) in a given com-
munity. Some of the structure of the joint behavior is coded in expectations of the actors,
but the actual structure is realized only during the social interaction.
1.1 Overview of the Paper
The ¯rst part of the paper frames the discussion of convention. Matters concerning joint
cognition and behavior are discussed in the terms of Clark's (1996) model of joint activity.
Lewis' (1969) de¯nition of convention is presented. Scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) is
discussed as an example of a cognitive theory about conventional behavior. Research on
situated activity (Suchman, 1987) and distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995a) is used to
critique the script model of reasoning about conventions of behavior and is also used to
develop a more interactive and situative model of everyday reasoning about conventional
behavior. Points of coordination, designs (and structures) for activity, and the distinction
between expectations about joint behavior and realizations of joint behavior are some of the
critical features of the analysis.
The second part of the paper explores the emergence of convention in circumstances
where there is not a ruling body of knowledge developed by prior generations of actors within
the community to draw on as potential designs for cooperative and coordinated behaviors.
Our example domain (MOVERS-WORLD) is a group of actors who are part of a moving
company. Their job is to move boxes and furniture from a house into a truck. Actors start
o® with very little knowledge of each others capabilities, behavioral patterns, or roles. With
practice, individuals within the community begin to converge on a set of conventions for
behaviors that match the regularly occurring problems of coordination in the domain of
activity. The community improves its performance despite the fact that individual actors
reason independently about their experiences. Because the actors use prior experiences to
guide future behaviors, they can, however, indirectly adjust their expectations about the
best way to coordinate behavior by making adjustments that re°ect the success and failure
of this or that act. Memory for joint activity is organized around points of coordination that
occurred during prior activities. The middle of the paper works through some of the details
of our architectural assumptions.
The third part of the paper presents a set of experiments that explore some features of
convention within the context of MOVERS-WORLD. The ¯rst set of experiments exam-
ine the performance changes that occur as conventions of behavior develop to match the
pragmatics of the domain. Conventions reduce the amount of work (number of actions) to
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achieve a set of common goals. Conventions reduce the amount of planning and communica-
tion that individuals need to do in order to stay coordinated. The second set of experiments
analyze how memory for prior coordinated activity contributes to improvements in perfor-
mance. These latter experiments show that MOVERS-WORLD actors are learning to orient
themselves to a situation in compatible manners, i.e., they are working on related goals and
develop plans with similar expectations about points of coordination. One hypothesis |
that an ideal script for a conventional behavior is being determined in the individual minds
of participating actors | is rejected.
The paper concludes with a lengthy discussion section. After returning to the theme
of a uni¯ed framework for the study of cognition, three questions are considered: Can the
entire structure of conventional behaviors be reduced to a unique idealized form accessible
independently by each participant prior to activity? Are the the processes that compose
everyday reasoning identical to those of analytic and scienti¯c reasoning? Are two minds
reducible to one?
2 Joint Activity and Convention
2.1 Joint Activity
Joint activities are essentially a complex of coordination problems (Clark, 1996). Playing a
duet, shaking hands, rowing a boat in tandem, eating dinner at a restaurant, talking with
a friend, and so on, are all joint activities that require that the participants solve a set of
coordination problems.
Joint activities have participants, who assume public roles. There are joint public
goals and private ones. Joint activities emerge as a hierarchy of joint actions and joint
(sub)activities. The entry and exit boundaries of a joint activity are jointly engineered by
the participants. Joint activities advance one increment at a time, mostly through joint ac-
tions. Joint actions are created when people coordinate with each other. Joint actions have
phases that have entry and exit points, each of which require coordination. Coordination on
the entry and exit times to each phase can be achieved by means of di®erent strategies.
An example of a joint activity is Sam and Gladys, two teenagers on a date engineering a
`¯rst kiss'. Sam and Gladys are the participants. Sam's public role is `Romeo' and Gladys'
public role is `Juliet'. Their joint public goal is to kiss; their private goals may di®er. Entry
into the ¯rst stage of kissing is jointly engineered by the participants. Sam and Gladys are
doing their parts in the joint action of initiating a kiss. Coordination of entry and exit times
for each of the phases, from the initial touch, to looking into each others eyes, to the ¯rst
touch of lips, is jointly achieved. The joint action (activity) of Sam and Gladys kissing for
the ¯rst time is a complex of coordination problems.
What accumulates during a joint activity is common ground. At any moment during a
joint activity, common ground has three parts: initial common ground, current state of the
joint activity, and public events so far. The initial common ground is the set of background
facts, assumptions, and beliefs presupposed at the outset of the joint of activity. The current
state of the joint activity is where in the activity the participants presupposed themselves
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to be. The public events are those events presupposed by the participants as leading up to
the current state of a®airs.
The initial common ground for Sam and Gladys' kissing includes the cultural history
within their community for the activity of `¯rst kissing' and the prior dating behaviors of
their clique. As Sam and Gladys proceed through the activity, changes in common ground
slowly, inexorably, move from assumptions and beliefs that the `¯rst kiss' might happen to
the con¯rmation that it has. Events like Sam putting his hand on Gladys' shoulder, and
Gladys reciprocating by putting her hand on his hip, are `public' events which mark the
progress of the couple in their joint activity.
2.2 Convention
Lewis (1969) de¯nes convention as a `solution' to a recurrent coordination problem. Con-
ventions are the regularities of behavior that develop among a community of actors with a
tradition of common goals and shared activities. Examples of behavioral conventions are:
1. How you answer the telephone: \This is the Alterman residence." Greeting a colleague
at work: you say \Hi." Greeting an associate at a meeting: you shake hands. Greeting
family you have not seen in awhile: you give them a hug.
2. The division of labor between a husband and wife: for cleaning up after dinner, she
clears the table and puts the leftovers away; he does the dishes. In the morning, she
prepares breakfast and he makes bag lunches for the kids.
3. Pedestrians crossing in opposite directions at a busy intersection in downtown San
Francisco: Say \Excuse me" if you bump into somebody else; tend to walk on right
hand side; and stay within the crosswalk.
4. Dressing appropriately for a dinner party, for work, for the opera, ...
5. The procedure you follow for buying lunch at a restaurant.
6. Where to meet a student for an appointment. Where to meet your doctor for a physical
exam. Where to buy a ticket for a movie, catch the bus, or board an airplane.
7. The usage of tools and devices (artifacts): The ways that door knobs are manipulated,
the opening and closing of doors, or books, or packages, or containers, taking the cap o®
a pen, pushing the tab of a ball point pen, opening a CD case, starting up a computer,
turning on the light switch, using headphones, calling on a telephone, ...
8. The manufacturing of any artifact involves conventions about the size, shape, and
function of its various parts. For example, there are conventions for sizes, shapes, and
strengths of boxes that have developed between the communities of actors who make
and use them.
In each of these situations, there is a recurrent coordination problem that is being `solved'.
Other features of Lewis' de¯nition concern common knowledge and the arbitrariness of
convention. Convention is a regularity R in the behavior of members of a given community
that occurs in a recurrent situation S (Lewis, 1969: p. 78). Several things must be common
knowledge within the community regarding any instance of S. Almost everyone conforms to
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R and expects almost everyone else to conform to it too. The actors within a given situation
S all have approximately the same preferences for all combinations of actions. Conventions
also have an element of arbitrariness. Conventions are arbitrary because there always exists
another regularity of behavior for the situation that would work as well. Where a unique
solution exists, members of the community conform to it not because it is a convention but
because it is the best thing to do.
While we agree with some of the general features of Lewis de¯nition (i.e., common knowl-
edge and the arbitrariness of convention), there are some technical problems with Lewis
de¯nition. Most of these problems stem from the lack of an adequate set of cognitive as-
sumptions. Take, for example, the notion of a recurrent situations S. How is it that two
actors will agree to what situation S is? In any kind of social situation, it is highly unlikely
the participants in the situation will agree a priori to what S is | that it is what is nego-
tiated among the participants as a part of their social interaction. Another problem with
Lewis' de¯nition is the notion that a convention is a ¯xed regularity R. Because of variation
in circumstances and continuous change, because of the work that needs to be done to align
perspectives among the participants, the idea that the convention has a unique structure R
is suspect. The participants can share expectations about the structure of a conventional
activity, but the actual structure of the conventional behavior on a given occasion will be
uniquely determined on each occasion.
2.3 Internalized, Emergent, and/or Situative?
Scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977) is an example of a cognitive theory that is meant to
account for convention-based behavior. A script represents a sequence of events coupled to
a particular context with actors having roles and coordinating their behavior in predictable
ways in order to achieve overlapping goals. Attending a movie, a restaurant, a wedding, or a
Bar Mitzvah are all occasions of script-like activity | as are riding a train, °ying in a plane,
or boarding an oceangoing vessel.
The notion of a script was developed before models of goal-directed behavior were trans-
formed from plan-based to activity-based (Suchman, 1987; Agre & Chapman, 1990). In
the mid-80's, models of goal-directed behavior began to account for the uncertainty of the
world. Plan-based models assumed a benign world, where things went according to plan:
one makes a plan and then executes it. For various reasons, researchers began to consider
alternate models of behavior: the intractability of planning (Chapman, 1987), the inadequa-
cies of models of acting that were dependent on internal representations (Brooks, 1991), the
binding problem (Agre & Chapman, 1987), and the general uncertainty of the world. Under
these newer schemes, plans were not a complete speci¯cation of action. Rather, plans were
vague, only providing an orientation (Suchman, 1987). Much of the structure in the activity
emerged from the individual's interaction with the environment during activity and did not
exist prior to the activity (Gar¯nkel, 1967).
These kinds of critiques also apply to models like scripts. A script is a rigid representa-
tion of a particular sequence of events; for everyday behavior, the uncertainty of the world
forces a less rigid representational form for knowledge of conventions. Pedestrians crossing
in opposite directions at a busy intersection in downtown San Francisco is an example of
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individuals coordinating their behavior in a regular manner where their joint behavior is
not characterizable by a script. Another example is the joint activity of a team of movers.
In moving furniture and boxes from the house into a truck, there exist regular patterns of
coordination among the crew, but none of these can be rei¯ed into a script. In both cases,
there is too much uncertainty for events to unfold exactly according to some pre-determined
script. Even activities that seem more script-like in nature, such as buying lunch at the drive-
through at McDonald's, are ¯lled with numerous events that are part of the `drive-through
scenario' but deviate from the speci¯cations of the script. While placing your order, your
daughter Emma interrupts to change her order from a Sprite to a Coca Cola, and maybe, on
second thought she would prefer a plain cheeseburger to the Chicken McNuggets. Deviations
in the main current of the activity are constant and commonplace. A pre-determined script
that each of the actors follows only accounts for some of the richness of the phenomena.
For a joint activity of buying food at the drive-through at McDonalds, there is more than
one expected point of coordination. The term points of coordination refers to the points in
a joint activity when participants are interacting with one another in order to develop some
common course of action. These include requests and responses, which identify and commit
actors to joint activities, and waiting, which is used to synchronize the actions between
participants. Over time, actors within a given community of practice begin to expect that
certain points of coordination will occur during the course of conventional activities. During
the technical discussion of memory, points of coordination will be a key feature of our model
of individual memory.
Collectively, the points of coordination assumed by the individuals within a community
form a design for the activity. The ongoing process within a community of actors to create
structures for common activities that simplify coordination is the design process. From the
perspective of a larger time scale, the structure of conventional behavior is a product of the
historical process of design. Designs for conventional activities are re-used and extended by
means of continued joint activity/ social interaction within a community of actors who share
a common set of tasks to accomplish.
Internalization of some portions of the design is a pre-requisite for generating conventions
of behaviors (it is part of the initial common ground), but the design is not a complete
speci¯cation of what occurs when the convention of behaviors unfold. Whatever expectations
are realized require joint e®ort by the participants. Much of the work they do to keep
themselves in-synch and on-track involves helping one another by con¯rming and realizing
each other's expectations through verbal and non-verbal communication. There is no ¯xed
design for a conventional activity. It emerges uniquely on each occasion of activity. Over
time the expectations within the community converge somewhat. Nevertheless, because
of uncertainty, dynamics, and change, the design never reaches the status of a unique ¯xed
internal structure. This account is both interactive (Suchman, 1987; Lave, 1988; Agre, 1997)
and situative (Hutchins, 1995a:1995b; Greeno, 1998).
A key feature of an interactive account is that structure emerges from the give-and-take
of activity that does not exist prior to the activity. For Suchman (1987: p. 52), a plan
for canoeing down a series of whitewater rapids may orient one, but much of the apparent
structure of the activity emerges from the activity itself. The work of Sachs, Scheglo®, and
Je®erson (1974) makes the case that turn-taking in conversation is a locally and interac-
tionally managed form of group decision-making that is administered by the participants
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of the conversation; it emerges from the conversation and is not pre-determinable. Lave's
work (1988) on the `dialectic' of a shopper doing arithmetic in the grocery store shows how
context is inseparably part of the activity. For Lave, Murtaugh and de la Rocha (1984: p.
75), one's personal sense of an activity of shopping at the supermarket is not completely
internalized; the potential of a given `setting" is only realized in the dialectic of activity. In
Arti¯cial Intelligence, the work of Agre (1997) and Agre & Chapman (1987:1990) demon-
strates how `plan-like' behavior can emerge without planning from an interaction between
the machinery of the individual's reasoning processes and the dynamics of the world. In their
PENGI model, the actor continuously redecides what to do; its representations are deictic,
thus requiring an interaction to be realized. In each of these cases, cognition and some of
the structure of behavior is emerging from activity and interaction.
Conventions of behavior are partially emergent. The participants in a joint activity have
a predisposition to act in ways that will simplify coordination. They have familiarity with
points of coordination (designs) for certain kinds of activities, but the potential of these
designs is realized and emerges only during the activity. The convention of behavior is not
uniquely determinable independent of the occasion and procession of a given activity. One
time it emerges one way, a second time a di®erent way; certain points of coordination tend to
be realized on each occasion, but in di®erent manners. Some of the structure of the activity,
of which one would attribute the term `convention', emerges from the activity itself.
The situative view emphasizes the study of cognition in terms of units of analysis larger
than an individual (Hutchins, 1993: p. 62):
If the individual mind itself is the only locus considered for the structures that
organize thinking, then everything that is required to create a su±cient account
of cognitive activity has to be crammed into the individual mind. This leads the
followers of this view to try to put more in the individual mind than belongs
there. The properties of groups of minds in interaction with each other, or the
properties of the interaction between individual minds and artifacts in the world,
are frequently at the heart of intelligent human performance.
One of Hutchins' example is the airplane pilot and the cockpit. He argues (1995b: p.
286) \The cockpit system remembers its speed, and the memory process emerges from the
activity of pilots. The memory of the cockpit, however, is not made primarily of pilot
memory." Some signi¯cant amount of what needs to be remembered by the airplane pilot
is located in representations (e.g., the `speed bugs' on the airspeed indicator) available in
the task environment; thus tasks requiring complex and costly internal memory operations
can be distributed. A second example is the navigation of a naval vessel that is underway
(Hutchins, 1995a:1993). There are two parts to navigating a ship: position ¯xing (which
essentially answers the question where are we) and dead reckoning (where are we heading).
Position ¯xing is distributed among the ship personnel and their tools. Bearing takers, timer-
recorders, plotters, the keeper of the deck log, and the fathometer operator all participate
in position ¯xing. Several actions are coordinated to occur simultaneously at the call of
\standby to mark." Much of the computation in ¯xing the point is done by the nautical
chart (the mercator projection chart), which is a specially constructed artifact that supports
this computation. The cognition that is occurring is distributed and is part of a larger
socio-technical system.
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Everyday actors also rely on the larger context to manage the achievement of a conven-
tional behavior. There are no guarantees that two actors' expectations about the course of
a joint activity will exactly match. They may have some overlapping expectations about
points of coordination, but other parts of the design are contingent on the speci¯cs of the
larger context. Novices at a particular kind of conventional activity can rely on the larger
context to ¯ll in gaps in knowledge. The ¯rst time an individual uses a device, she may
realize a convention of behavior, even though she may not be familiar with the type of
device she uses. This is because instructions are generally available in the larger context.
When the individual dials a number on the air telephone for the ¯rst time, information is
provided in the design of the setting to aid the user in performing the needed conventions of
behavior. The label on one of the buttons indicates `dial tone', the button a®ords pushing,
other buttons are labeled with numbers. The instructions inform the user she must ¯rst push
the dial tone button and wait for a dial tone before dialing the number. Other situations,
with di®erent arrangements in the design of the interface, require the user to draw on her
knowledge of other conventions for operating devices. In each case, the setting of device
usage provides signs for the user to interpret in order to determine the situation. Emerging
from the development of the activity in the larger context is a convention of behavior that
did not pre-exist in the mind of the individual actor, but ¯ts the design for the activity that
has been developed within her community of actors.
2.4 The Design of an Activity
Design is a method for making a device or tool more usable (Norman, 1988). Some features
of the design process are (Winograd, 1996: p. xiii-xxv): The design process creates artifacts
that are well-suited to their environments of use. Design activities require the management of
trade-o®s. \The ongoing process of design is iterative at two levels: iteration by the designer
as a piece of current work develops, and iteration by the community as successive generations
reveal new possibilities for the medium." Design entails an ongoing dialog between designers
and users. Design is a social activity. Users avail themselves of the design as a support for
using the artifact; it informs the users' activity (Norman, 1988). Participatory design occurs
when the people destined to use the artifact play a critical role in designing it (see Schuler
& Namoika, 1993; Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991).
All of these features of the design process for artifacts apply to the design process that
co-participants realize as they produce, with practice, a design for regularly occurring joint
activities. The design of a conventional behavior is tied to the emergence of a more reliable
set of expectations about the points of coordination most like to occur in a given situation.
The creation of structures for conventional behavior is a participatory design process. Each
time co-participants iterate through a recurring joint activity, improvements in the design
can occur. Iteration by successive generations of the community reveal new possibilities for
designs of joint activities. Over time, for regularly occurring problems of coordination, a
design for the activity develops. A design for a conventional behavior is part of the initial
common ground shared within a commmunity of actors. A design may have an external
representation (e.g., instructions) but it is mainly coded in the expectations of individuals
about expected points of coordination. Knowledge of designs for conventional activities, and
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access to external representations of it, is a resource that informs the participants' reasoning
as they proceed with a joint behavior.
Suppose an actor is helping another actor in a wheelchair pass through a doorway. A
husband Dick recently broke his leg in a skiing accident and he is in a wheelchair; his wife
Jane is helping him to get about. From Jane's perspective, a design that coordinates her
pushing Dick through a doorway will emerge as the the activity proceeds. How to position
the wheelchair, when to open the door, and what are reasonable expectations about what
participants can and will do, are features of the situation that must be discovered. At
the outset, the ¯rst time, one does not know a good design for the activity; however, the
physical constraints of the situation and constraints that emerge from the actions of each
of the participants will shape the joint activity (Norman, 1988); the participants jointly
attune their behavior to the constraints and a®ordances of the situation (Greeno, 1998: p.
8-9). If another couple were in a similar situation, one would expect them to work out a
similar design because many of the constraints and a®ordances that are reasoned about are
present in the design and construction of the doors, doorways, and wheelchairs that are
used. Through continued practice, Dick and Jane develop a good design for the activity (a
convention of behavior). Certain points of coordination become regular features of how they
negotiate this kind of joint activity; there are points of coordination in the design that Dick
and Jane can reasonably expect will be achieved during the activity.
Whatever design for the activity emerges, it is historically conditioned. Each of the
artifacts (i.e., doorways, doors, wheelchairs) has a history of designed activities in which it is
used. Whenever actors learn to use a wheelchair, they are part of a continuing story about
wheelchair design, construction, and usage. The performance of this activity is tied to the
performance of the same activity by prior generations of individuals within the community,
(re)emerging from the movement forward of prior joint activities (Cole & EngestrÄ om, 1993).
For a given activity, there may be multiple designs available to participants against which
they can coordinate their behavior. Consider the general case of two people coordinating
their e®orts to pass through a doorway. There is no unique pre-determined design for
coordinating behavior: men open doors for women, adults for the elderly, anybody for a
person in a wheelchair or a parent pushing a baby carriage, adults for children, and teenage
boys never open the door for each other. Participants in an activity must agree on their
assessment of the situation in order for things to proceed smoothly. Suppose Susan and
Steve approach the door and Steve is older than Susan. Whether it is a case of men opening
doors for women or young adults for the elderly is a matter of degree. For a joint action to
run smoothly, participants must be signaling to one another how to interpret the situation;
either Susan or Steve may begin to make a movement toward the door handle and begin to
position their body so as to open the door for the other person.
Activities that have pre-existing designs are not completely predetermined. There are
portions of the activity that are not designed and, to operate e®ectively, one needs to reason
about those too. Removing an aspirin from a bottle is an example of emergent structure
discussed by Agre (1997: p. 164). Clearly, parts of the activity are not designed. Agre's
point is that there is no way to anticipate how the aspirins are arranged in the bottle before
you open it. On the other hand, other parts of the activity are designed. Opening the bottle
is designed; it involves pushing the cap and rotating it counter clockwise. Instructions for
the design exist on the face of the cap. Even if a design for a portion of the activity does not
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pre-exist, the functioning of the individual's memory in support of activity may e®ectively
impose one. If the bottle is full, an aspirin may be accessed using two ¯ngers. If the bottle
is almost empty, slowly pour one out; if more than one lands in the palm of you hand, slowly
pour all but one back. In fact, these behaviors re°ect the design of aspirin bottles, which in
turn are subject to the constraints that emerged from prior aspirin-bottle use.
A novice cannot obtain the design of an activity purely by analysis; she must reason
pragmatically (Alterman, Zito-Wolf, and Carpenter, 1998). The design can only be obtained
by action, through continued practice, relying on communication between participants (even
if one of the participants is in absentia). If I visit a stereo components store, each of the
CD players exhibited in the showroom are likely to have a di®erent design. In one case,
switching to the next song in sequence involves pushing a button with À signs on it, but
for a di®erent device the same e®ect is achieved by rotating a knob. For one CD player the
power button is a push button and is located in the upper left hand corner of the face of
the device, for another CD player it is a switch and located elsewhere. As a member of a
community of actors who use such devices, I am already familiar with a large number of
conventions for the interfaces for devices of this sort. Nevertheless, for a given device there
is no a priori analysis that will allow me to determine exactly which conventions and in what
sequence they are to be followed. There are no rules of inference (be it induction, deduction,
or abduction) that will allow one to determine the exact state of a®airs at the scene of the
activity in using a device independent of the activity of using the device.
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3 The Computational Model
Model construction is an important part of scienti¯c reasoning and analytic problem-solving.
The computational model has played a special role in Cognitive Science as a method for merg-
ing results and ideas across disciplines. The computational model discussed in the remainder
of this paper examines the interplay of the individual and social elements of cognition. From
the perspective of individual psychology, the task is to rework, in a manner consistent with
the larger context, theories of cognition that resulted from a history of experimentation in
indoor psychology. From the perspective of the social theories of cognition, the computa-
tional model shows how properties of the larger system can emerge from the interplay of
individual cognitions. By integrating results across disciplinary boundaries, constraints and
opportunities emerge that lead to general progress.
Starting with this section, the paper presents some of the details of a computational
model of the emergence of convention in circumstances where there is not a ruling body of
knowledge developed by prior generations of actors within the community to draw on as
potential designs for cooperative and coordinated behavior.
3.1 Domain: MOVERS-WORLD
In the remainder of the paper, we will model and experimentally investigate everyday rea-
soning about conventional behavior using the computational testbed of MOVERS-WORLD.
The task in MOVERS-WORLD (see Figure 1) is to move boxes from a house onto a truck.
The conventions that develop depend on speci¯c characteristics of the participants in the
joint activity and on the features of objects and artifacts about which they reason.
MBOX3
SBOX5
L1 L2
LBOX2
HANDTR2
TRUCK1
HTO1 ROOM1
STREET
Figure 1: Sample MOVERS-WORLD problem.
MOVERS-WORLD has two types of actors: hand-truck operators (such as HTO1 in
Figure 1) and lifters (L1 and L2). MOVERS-WORLD contains three types of objects: boxes,
hand-trucks, and a single moving truck. Boxes come in four sizes: extra-large (XLBOX),
large (LBOX), medium (MBOX) and small (SBOX). Large and extra-large boxes require two
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lifters to lift, and extra-large boxes are too unwieldy to be carried. Hand-trucks can hold
one large or extra-large box or any combination of two smaller boxes. Hand-truck operators
are not capable of handling boxes directly so loading and unloading a hand-truck requires
the cooperation of at least one lifter.
The actions in MOVERS-WORLD are represented in the \minds" of the individual actors
as STRIPS operators (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971). Depending on their type, di®erent actors have
di®erent operations that they can perform, i.e.,
lifter LIFT, LIFT-TOGETHER, CARRY, CARRY-TOGETHER, LOAD, LOAD-TOGETHER,
UNLOAD, UNLOAD-TOGETHER, PUT-DOWN, and PUT-DOWN-TOGETHER.
hand-truck operator PUSH-HANDTR, TILT-HANDTR, and STAND-HANDTR.
There are also general purpose operators that any actor can perform, i.e.,
MOVE, WAIT, and SIGN.
The actors do not know the types of other actors or even have an internal representation of
the concept of type. Furthermore, they have no built-in knowledge about the operators for
actors of other types; for example, lifters do not know initially know how the hand-truck can
be utilized.
Some important features of the model are:
1. Initially actors have no knowledge of the social roles or capabilities of other actors.
2. Participants reason separately about their joint activity.
3. Ongoing communication is central to cooperation and coordination during the activity.
4. Regularities in the coordination of behavior develop with practice.
5. Memory is distributed among the individual actors; there is no central memory.
For the experiments discussed later in the paper, the community solves 420 problems.
Each problem requires the actors to move from 3 to 5 boxes of various sizes to the truck.
The baseline system initially takes, on average, 1026.6 simulated time steps (called \ticks"
hereafter) to solve a problem.
3.2 Coordination of Behavior
An example of a joint activity in MOVERS-WORLD is L1 and L2 loading a large box onto
the hand-truck.
L1, L2, and HTO1 agree that large box LBOX2 will be loaded onto the hand-
truck. HTO1 must stand the hand-truck before any box can be loaded on top of
it. L1 and L2 must jointly engineer the lifting and loading of LBOX2.
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The joint activity of L1, L2, and HTO1 is a complex of coordination problems. Coordination
of entry and exit times for each of the phases, from lifting the box to loading the box onto
the hand-truck after HTO1 maneuvers it into a standing position, are jointly achieved by
the participants. L1 and L2 must initiate a sequence of actions at the same time and
then, step-by-step, they must execute lift-together and load-together. If they fail to achieve
synchronicity, breakdowns will occur that require explicit agreements (via communication)
to re-coordinate the actors.
Depending on the circumstances, each of Clark's (1996: p. 64) four types of coordination
devices may be in play for an activity like loading LBOX2 onto the hand-truck. When the
hand-truck is standing in the same room as LBOX2, it signals the readiness of the hand-
truck for loading (salience). L1 and L2 could communicate to one another when they are
ready to begin lifting (explicit agreement). If HTO1 has only done this once before and, on
that prior occasion, her job was to ready the hand-truck for loading, then she could assume
her job in the current setting is to stand the hand-truck (precedence). Loading a large box
onto the hand-truck is a regular problem of coordination among the community of actors in
MOVERS-WORLD (convention).
Over time, given their understanding of the current regularities of coordination, the
actors are continuously (re)learning the best ways to coordinate behavior. Actors rarely (if
ever) have complete theories or agreements on the optimal way to act. Consider a problem
situation where two lifters and a hand-truck operator are in a room with an extra-large box
and two medium-sized ones. A reasonable way to coordinate behavior is:
1. A lifter and the hand-truck operator agree to load the hand-truck with the extra-large
box.
2. The lifters lift the extra-large box together.
3. The lifters load the extra-large box onto the hand-truck.
4. In parallel:
(a) The hand-truck operator pushes the hand-truck to the street and stands it up.
(b) Each lifter carries a medium-sized box to the street and loads it onto the truck.
5. A lifter and the hand-truck operator agree to load the extra-large box onto the truck.
6. The lifters unload the extra-large box from the hand-truck.
7. The lifters load the extra-large box onto the truck.
At every turn in the action, the actors are reasoning about the situation in complementary
manners. Attaining this performance level of coordination between actors is an ACHIEVE-
MENT. This exact scenario may or may not have occurred previously, e.g., the previous time
there could have been another box or actor present. Initially, an individual actor has very
little knowledge about the roles, skills or predilections of other actors. Another complication
is that the MOVERS-WORLD actors reason and learn independently (there is no central
control). Achieving this level of coordination depends on e®ective communication during
the course of action and the existence, among participants, of a common set of expectations
about points of coordination for recurrent problems of coordination.
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It would be possible to engineer the domain in order to simplify the coordination problem
to ¯t the requirements of current Arti¯cial Intelligence planning technology. We could give
each actor, at the outset, a complete speci¯cation of all the actions, attributes, and capabili-
ties of each of the other actors. Such a design would almost reduce the planning problem for a
multi-actor system to the planning problem for a single actor system. Actors would still have
to communicate about intentions and commitments, for example, but an individual actor
(all alone) could plan out a cooperative activity. This engineering of the domain is common
practice in Arti¯cial Intelligence. Given a problem domain, the ¯rst order of business is to
reduce that problem domain to a formulation for which current AI techniques apply. But
for the cognitive modeler, these kind of reductions are problematic. Giving individual actors
complete knowledge of other actors capabilities and priorities may simplify the domain, but
is unwarranted even upon casual examination of the relevant phenomena. Because there
is no central planning architecture, MOVERS-WORLD is both a more realistic testbed for
modeling conventional behavior and a challenging domain for developing next generation
Arti¯cial Intelligence technology.
4 Modeling the Social Interaction
The basic cycle for the community of MOVERS-WORLD goes as follows:
1. A problem is generated for the community of actors to solve.
2. The community of actors solves the problem.
3. O²ine learning occurs.
A problem is a set of \top-level" goals and a description of the initial state of the world;
for the experiments in this paper, all actors are allocated the same set of top-level goals.
The overall control structure for the community of MOVERS-WORLD is not hierarchical
nor is planning centralized. Actors do not share an overarching plan or reason explicitly
about group concepts (c.f., Levesque, Cohen, & Nunes, 1990), rather cooperation emerges
from local interactions. The capacities of other actors is not treated as a given, but this
information is acquired through experience. Communication is an action, and it occurs at
run-time. Each of these assumptions can be contrasted to assumptions that have been made
in prior work in Distributed Arti¯cial Intelligence and Multi-Agent Systems (George®, 1983;
Durfee & Lesser, 1987; Genesereth, Ginsberg, & Rosenschien, 1986; Tambe, 1997; Corkill,
1979; Wilkens & Myers, 1998).
Improvement in the performance of the community occurs over several episodes of com-
munity activity. During step 2, individuals are satis¯ed with any solution. In step 3 the
actors store into memory the portions of the behavior that they believed were essential to the
solution. In future episodes, segments of the behavior are recalled and further improvements
can occur. Thus, expectations about points of coordination can develop over time leading
to improvements in the performance of the community.
The memory of the community of actors is distributed: individuals have access to only
their private memories of their experiences. There is no o®-line discussion to form a con-
sensus on the best way to accomplish their joint goals. At issue will be the processes by
16   
which actors within the community, with sometimes overlapping and sometimes con°icting
expectations, develop conventional behaviors for coordinating joint activities for regularly
occurring problem situations in the domain of activity.
4.1 Communication
In MOVERS-WORLD, communication is the central mechanism for establishing and main-
taining cooperation and coordination. Actors limit themselves to single requests; transmit-
ting single requests lowers both communication costs and plan merging costs, which can be
considerable for distributed, independent actors.
Two actors are said to `cooperate' if they act or work together to achieve some common
purpose and they are `coordinated' when their individual actions are appropriately ordered
to support cooperative activity. In our framework, communication is the only mechanism
whereby actors can determine if they are cooperating. In other words, there are no global
structures, such as blackboards (e.g., Lesser, Fennell, Erman, and Reddy, 1975), for actors to
use to determine if they happen to be working on the same goal. Each MOVERS-WORLD
problem-solving episode includes goals that can only be solved by cooperating actors, so
communication is an essential part of the community activity.
Communication is used to attempt to establish cooperation when the set of actors working
on a goal at a given time is inadequate. Cooperation is not guaranteed during communication
since actors have their own decision-making strategies; even if an actor is willing to cooperate,
she may be unable to do so. An actor who is unwilling or unable to assist can propose an
alternative that the original requester may now contemplate adopting. Each actor presently
uses the same strategy for deciding whether to cooperate: preference is given to the plan
that achieves her top-level goals in the most time-e±cient manner. Despite their common
strategy, actors will make di®erent decisions because of di®erences in their experiences.
Communication between actors in our system is similar to a telephone conversation; only
two actors can participate in a single conversation. Actors do not have to be in the same
location to engage in communication. One actor can call another and either establishes a
connection, gets a busy signal, or the other actor does not respond. Once a connection is
established, communication is handled via request and response frames. After agreeing to
cooperate, an actor can opt-out at any time, without obligation to notify other actors.
A conversation between actors is made up of requests and responses. An example of a
request a LIFTER might make is: \Would you help me achieve (HOLDING-TOGETHER
XLBOX3)". Three possible responses to a request like this are \Yes, but you will have
to wait", \No, I don't want to", or \I can't, but I was hoping you would help me achieve
(ON MBOX1 HANDTR)." There are three initial request types and eighteen responses,
twelve of which make an alternate request to the original caller. In practice, not all of
the 234 potential sequences of request and response types are possible; for the 420 learning
trials described in the empirical results section, there were 55,584 conversations comprising
67 di®erent sequences. 53,710 conversations, in 38 di®erent sequences, contained a single
request and 1,874 conversation, in 29 sequences, contained more than one request.
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4.2 Coordinating Joint Activity
Communication and waiting jointly form the mechanism whereby joint activities are coor-
dinated in MOVERS-WORLD. Communication is used to establish agreement about points
of coordination. Both communication and waiting are methods used to determine entry and
exit times for the phases of a joint activity. When cooperation is ¯rst established during
communication, the actors must determine how they will coordinate the cooperative activ-
ity. Sometimes, nothing need be done { for example, if two lifters are both adjacent to a
ready-to-be-lifted box and both are ready to lift it. More often, though, the requester will
idle for one or several time steps { for example, if the requestee lifter is not currently ready
to lift the box. Another common situation is when a hand-truck operator idles after a lifter
agrees to load a box onto a hand-truck. Idling is presently implemented by adding a WAIT
to the beginning of her plan. While the WAIT is at the beginning of her plan, an actor is
waiting for one of two events to occur: communication indicating that joint action can occur
(e.g., the other lifter now indicates she is ready to act) or the completion of her request (e.g.
the box appears on the hand-truck). If an actor is idle too long, she will become frustrated
and inquire about the status of her request, possibly discovering the other actor has opted
out. Other ways to coordinate actors are by observation (Huber & Durfee, 1995) or plan
recognition (Huber & Hadley, 1997), but these techniques require that detailed knowledge
about the motives and capabilities of the entire community is built into each actor to begin
with.
The following two examples show trace snippets involving cooperation in unloading a
box from a hand-truck and loading it onto the truck. The examples are actual output of
the system (with unrelated actions trimmed), but they are illustrative, not prototypical;
empirically, actors agree to cooperate less than half of the time when they have di®erent
goals. In Figure 2, L1 happens to have the same goals as HTO1 before conversing; in
Figure 3, she does not. In both cases, HTO1 will add a WAIT operator to her plan as a
result of the conversation with L1.
Ticks 152 to 176: <MOVE PR24-STREET1> by L1 successful
Ticks 177 to 189: HTO1 and L1 converse
"L1, would you help me achieve (ON PR24-MBOX0 TRUCK3)?"
"HTO1, I'm already working on it!"
Ticks 190 to 224: <UNLOAD PR24-MBOX0 HANDTR3> by L1 successful
Ticks 225 to 259: <LOAD PR24-MBOX0 TRUCK3> by L1 successful
Figure 2: Coordination based on ¯rst-principles: Same Goals.
As Figure 2 shows, when L1 and HTO1 have the same goals, their behavior is fairly
e±cient because L1 moves to the street before HTO1 makes her request. However, this kind
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of timing is exceptional. In this case, HTO1's request is super°uous, but there is no way for
the hand-truck operator to know this beforehand. A more common case, when the actors
have di®erent goals, is shown in Figure 3. As mentioned above, there is no guarantee L1 will
agree to help in this situation.
Ticks 131 to 150: <STAND-HANDTR HANDTR3 PR24-STREET1> by HTO1 successful
Ticks 151 to 163: HTO1 and L1 converse
"L1, would you help me achieve (ON PR24-MBOX0 TRUCK3)?"
"HTO1, I'll help, but you'll have to wait a bit."
Ticks 164 to 188: <MOVE PR24-STREET1> by L1 successful
Ticks 189 to 223: <UNLOAD PR24-MBOX0 HANDTR3> by L1 successful
Ticks 224 to 258: <LOAD PR24-MBOX0 TRUCK3> by L1 successful
Figure 3: Coordination based on ¯rst-principles: Di®erent Goals.
The responses that actors give during communication depend, in part, on how their cur-
rent plan relates to the incoming request. Since wait operators represent past and potential
agreements (important relationships between plans and requests), responses are strongly in-
°uenced by their presence. Wait operators are generated by agreeing to wait or through
the recollection of prior behaviors (which included agreements to wait). In other words, as
shown in Table 1, wait operators become part of the actor's plan either during a conversation
or during o®-line learning (see Section 5.1.2).
Told to Wait Learn to Wait
WAIT WAIT-FOR-REQUEST
WAIT-IMPLICIT
Table 1: Kinds of wait operators.
There are two variants of the WAIT operator contained in past memories of coordinated
behavior. They are functionally equivalent to WAIT, but there are semantic di®erences which
are relevant during communication. The ¯rst variant, WAIT-FOR-REQUEST, is introduced
whenever an actor agreed to a request during a previous activity. It acts as a place-holder
to represent when the actor expects a request to be made; during communication, this
must be treated di®erently than WAIT, which is only present when the actor has an explicit
agreement. The second variant, WAIT-IMPLICIT, is an optimization. A WAIT-IMPLICIT
replaces a SIGN operator which would be requesting a service to be performed. For example,
19   
with time, the hand-truck operator can learn when to expect the lifter to load the hand-
truck without explicitly being told to do so. Thus, a WAIT-IMPLICIT is an optimistic plan
modi¯cation: the actor expects a service by another actor without having to ask for it.
In Figure 4, the actors are working from plans which are derived from past joint activity
and the lifter's plan contains a WAIT-FOR-REQUEST operator. Although the two actors
are working from the same past interactions, L1 becomes frustrated waiting for HTO1 to
make her expected explicit request. As it turns out, L1's inquiry came in the same tick
that HTO1 would have made the request, so the conversation proceeds smoothly. Note that,
from an e±ciency stand-point, this is not better than either of the ¯rst-principles solutions.
However, in this case, the outcome is more robust: it does not depend on serendipitous
timing or agreeable actors. Examples of WAIT-IMPLICIT are given in Section 5.1.3, in the
discussion of optimizations.
Ticks 299 to 318: <STAND-HANDTR HANDTR3 PR36-STREET1> by HTO1 successful
Tick 317: L1 became frustrated since WAIT-FOR-REQUEST not satisfied
Ticks 319 to 375: HTO1 and L1 converse
"HTO1, I was expecting a call about (ON PR36-MBOX7 TRUCK3)."
"L1, would you help me achieve (ON PR36-MBOX7 TRUCK3)?"
"HTO1, I've lost track of those items."
"L1, here is that information."
"HTO1, I'll help, but you'll have to wait a bit."
Ticks 376 to 400: <MOVE PR36-STREET1> by L1 successful
Ticks 401 to 435: <UNLOAD PR36-MBOX7 HANDTR3> by L1 successful
Ticks 436 to 470: <LOAD PR36-MBOX7 TRUCK3> by L1 successful
Figure 4: Coordination based on explicit expectations: Same Goals.
20   
5 Modeling the Individual
5.1 Memory of Coordinated Behavior
Throughout the practice of their joint activities, participants are learning and re¯ning expec-
tations about productive sequences of joint actions. Individual actors plan for new activities
by borrowing from prior ones. The remembered success and failure of actions and decisions
are the basis for improvement in behavior and the development of convention. Where initial
experiences produce a set of biases, later ones re¯ne them. New members of the community,
or changes in the task environment, produce changes in the mix of regular joint behaviors
that are continuously developing.
Our formulation of this issue ties learning to the functioning of the memory of the in-
dividual actors. After the community of actors solves a problem, individual actors retain
in memory a description of that episode of joint behavior. This becomes the basis for the
development of conventional behaviors.
Three critical features of the model we present of the individual's memory of prior coor-
dinated behavior are:
1. Memories are derived from execution traces.
2. Memories feature points of coordination.
3. Individual actors reason independently.
There are two sets of reasons for why execution traces are the basis for memories. The
¯rst has to do with the functioning of memory retrieval. Memory retrieval is tied to surface
similarity features and not higher order relations between objects (see, for example, Gick &
Holyoak 1980; Gick & Holyoak 1983; Gentner 1989). By tieing memory indices to execution
traces, surface similarity features are likely to be present as indices to match against cues
available in the task environment. The second set of reasons re°ect emergent and situative
aspects of joint behavior. An execution trace for a single actor encapsulates the history of
both planned and unplanned activities within the domain. Consequently, an execution trace
contains more information than any of the plans of the individual actor: the trace includes
the history of actor behaviors required to solve the problem. This kind of information cannot
be extracted from the planning process, but it is relevant in orienting the actor towards future
joint behaviors.
Joint activities are a complex of coordination problems. Remembering points of coordi-
nation predisposes the individual actor to begin to anticipate those points of coordination in
future related joint activities. Individuals coordinating their behavior communicate at each
coordination point in order to begin the next phase of joint activity. The points at which
communication occurred between participants in the joint activity are stored as a part of the
memory of prior activity. Maintaining them as a part of the individual actors' expectations
about the progress of a joint activity helps to maintain common ground while keeping the
joint behavior coordinated.
If two actors are attempting to coordinate their behavior by remembering prior activity,
their remindings should organize their current behavior so as to reduce work as the activity
unfolds. Nevertheless, actors will assess the same situation in di®erent manners. This re°ects
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both di®erences in experience between actors and the open-endedness of interpretation in
general. Since remembering is dependent on the actor's assessment of the situation, actors
can retrieve incompatible plans. Communication provides an opportunity to redirect retrieval
to harmonize the expectations of participating actors.
There are three parts to our discussion of how memory is updated after a session of
activity:
1. Extracting coordinated procedures from execution traces.
2. Optimizing coordinated procedures.
3. Storing coordinated procedures in memory.
Within Arti¯cial Intelligence, memory-based approaches to reasoning are called case-
based reasoning (CBR: Kolodner, 1993). Others have applied CBR technology to multi-
agent systems (e.g., Haynes & Sen (1998); Ohko, Hiraki, and Anzai (1996); NagendraPrasad,
Lesser, and Lander, (1995)). None of these other works focused on procedural memory, the
role of points of coordination in stored procedures, or a method for learning conventions of
behavior. It is important that we clarify what is meant by the termcoordinated procedures.
A coordinated procedure is not a complete speci¯cation of a joint activity. Rather it is a
resource that provides a set of expectations about potential designs (points of coordination)
for unfolding joint activities.
5.1.1 A simple learned coordinated procedure
The simplest plan that lifters learn that their ¯rst-principles planner does not construct is
to load a box onto a hand-truck and later unload it and load it onto a truck at the behest
of a hand-truck operator. This cannot be generated by the ¯rst-principles planner because
initially lifters lack knowledge about hand-trucks and the behaviors of hand-truck operators.
This procedure can get created from the following snippet of activity involving medium-sized
box MBOX3.
First, a high-level description of the execution history:
1. Hand-truck operator HTO1 asks lifter L1 to get MBOX3 onto hand-truck HANDTR2.
L1 agrees and does so via lifting and loading the box. L1 next fails in an attempt to
lift large box LBOX2 by herself, does nothing for a tick since she has no plan, and lifts
small box SBOX5 while HTO1 tilts, pushes to the street, and stands up HANDTR2.
2. HTO1 asks L1 to get MBOX3 onto truck TRUCK1. L1 agrees, puts SBOX5 back
down, moves to the street, unloads the box from the hand-truck and then loads it onto
the truck.
L1 records her behavior internally, including information about active goals, cooperation
agreements, states of the world, attempted actions, reasons for attempting the actions, and
results of the attempts. These internal structures contain too much data to show fully, but
the gist of them is clear in the following listing of the relevant portion of L1's execution
trace:
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(<agreed to achieve (ON MBOX3 HANDTR2) for HTO1>
<executed (LIFT MBOX3)>
<executed (LOAD MBOX3 HANDTR2)>
<failed to (LIFT LBOX2)>
<executed (NO-OP)>
<executed (LIFT SBOX5)>
<agreed to achieve (ON MBOX3 TRUCK1) for HTO1>
<executed (PUT-DOWN SBOX5)>
<executed (MOVE STREET)>
<executed (UNLOAD MBOX3 HANDTR2)>
<executed (LOAD MBOX3 TRUCK1)>)
A lot of this information is not relevant to extracting segments of coordinated behavior from
the trace. Summarization and cleaning processes (described below) remove the irrelevant
information. In this example, the cleaning process removes the idle step (i.e, NO-OP), the
failed attempt and the two actions involving SBOX5, and the summarization process removes
the LIFT, MOVE, and UNLOAD (which are reproducible) leaving:
(<agreed to achieve (ON MBOX3 HANDTR2) for HTO1>
<executed (LOAD MBOX3 HANDTR2)>
<agreed to achieve (ON MBOX3 TRUCK1) for HTO1>
<executed (LOAD MBOX3 TRUCK1)>)
The coordinated behaviors need to be represented in a more general fashion before they are
stored in memory. For this example, the stored procedure would be:
(<WAIT-FOR-REQUEST ?ACTOR (ON ?BOX ?HANDTR)>
<LOAD ?BOX ?HANDTR>
<WAIT-FOR-REQUEST ?ACTOR (ON ?BOX ?TRUCK)>
<LOAD ?BOX ?TRUCK>)
5.1.2 Extracting coordinated procedures from the execution trace
Actors convert their run-time experience into coordinated procedures to be added to memory.
There are six steps to this process of extracting procedures that contain expectations about
points of coordination. (Further technical details can be found in Garland (2000).)
Cleaning the execution trace. Traces of execution-time activities are cleaned to remove
unsuccessful behavior, which simpli¯es further analysis and prevents reifying past mis-
takes. Failed primitive actions, refused requests and idle time constitute the bulk of the
trace entries removed during cleaning. This stage is a summarization process only in
the broadest sense: it removes events that could not possibly have directly contributed
to successfully achieving any goal; events that might have contributed are left in the
trace for later analysis.
23  
Segmenting the execution trace. The cleaned trace is next reorganized into groups of
actions that are related by the goals they achieve. There are two kinds of groupings
are implemented: goal-groupings and time-groupings. For each top-level goal the actor
achieved, the associated goal-grouping is identi¯ed by seeing if the goal literals intersect
with the operator role-¯llers for each action in the cleaned trace. Time-groupings are
found by looking at the actions in a time interval to see if their combined e®ect accom-
plishes a set of top-level goals; time-groupings allow the actors to learn to interleave
top-level goals (see example discussed in Section 5.1.4).
Removing ine±ciencies. The actor's run-time behavior will doubtlessly contain mistakes
of one sort or another. To prevent reifying sub-optimal behavior, it is desirable to
identify and remove such ine±ciencies. One could look at this step as either being a
continuation of the cleaning process or as the commencement of the summarization
process. The criteria for identifying ine±ciencies are simple to state: actors remove
primitive actions whose e®ects are undone (usually by herself) and communicative
acts associated with such primitive actions; also, all but one out of possibly several
communications about a coordination point are discarded.
Optimizing coordinated procedures. As an optional optimization, some of the coordi-
nation points may be modi¯ed. SIGNs about requests for service are changed into
WAIT-IMPLICITs, re°ecting an (optimistic) expectation that the request for service
will be satis¯ed without a direct request and WAIT-FOR-REQUESTs are dropped,
re°ecting an (optimistic) expectation that the actor knows the right time to accom-
plish the request without being speci¯cally asked. A further discussion of this process
is provided below in the next subsection of the paper.
Summarizing coordinated procedures. Actions which are planner-reconstructible are
removed from the segment during this step; with only a few exceptions, points of
coordination are retained in summary. Two important consequences of removing re-
constructible actions are to improve plan quality and reduce plan-merging e®ort at
communication time.
Preparing summarized procedures. The low-level representation for the actions in the
summarized trace segment is not suitable for re-use, so the procedure is prepared for
future problem-solving episodes before storage. A straightforward change is to replace
goal literals with variables. A more complicated preparation is to augment action
descriptions with role-binding information that is lost when actions are removed during
summarization or optimization.
Storing procedures in memory. Finally, the actor compares the prepared, summarized
procedure to current case-base entries to determine if it should be added to the case-
base or if a current entry should be generalized. Indexing at both storage and retrieval
time is based on the goals being achieved and observable characteristics (surface fea-
tures) of the setting. They are also indexed by expected points of coordination in
order to facilitate retrieval during communication. At storage time, individual actors
may have derived compatible procedures, but index them di®erently because they have
24  
di®erent perceptions either of the start time or of the setting at the start time. Similar
situation assessment problems arise at retrieval time. Discrepancies will be discovered
at runtime and communication provides an opportunity for the collaborators to get in
synch.
5.1.3 Optimizing coordinated procedures
Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993) describe a model of cultural learning. In their model,
learning depends on two levels of \intersubjectivity." First order intersubjectivity means all
participants concurrently and reciprocally are able to see a situation from other actors' points
of view. Second order (recursive) intersubjectivity means one actor can compare her internal
point of view to (her belief about) a second actor's version of the ¯rst actor's point of view.
The two kinds of intersubjectivity develop during di®erent stages of child development.
The techniques used by actors to extract coordinated procedures from the trace depends
on ¯rst order intersubjectivity. As our empirical results will demonstrate, the common
viewpoint that is inherent in plans derived in this way has leverage. However, situations
like the one shown in Figure 4 highlight an opportunity for improvement if the actors were
capable of recursive thinking. When the actors do see the setting in the same way, and recall
compatible plans from memory, they should need less explicit communication to coordinate.
A hand-truck operator can hope that a lifter will load and unload the hand-truck at the
appropriate times, and the lifter can hope that hand-truck operator will get the hand-truck
to the street if the lifter loads a box on it.
Actor performance can be improved if some second-order intersubjectivity is added via
heuristic optimizations. Two simple heuristics have been adopted in MOVERS-WORLD to
implement this. Any agreements made to accomplish a request for service (as opposed to a re-
quest for joint action) are dropped instead of being converted into WAIT-FOR-REQUESTs.
Reciprocally, any agreed-to requests for service are changed into implicit expectations, rep-
resented by WAIT-IMPLICITs.
Figures 5 and 6 show scenarios where these optimizations have been made. In both of
them, the box requires two lifters to handle. As the dialogues starting in ticks 217 and 273
of Figure 5 demonstrate, not all communication has been removed; namely, communication
about joint actions (which require more ¯ne-grained coordination) has been kept. Despite
this, the optimizations have led to an e±cient solution by the community because the implicit
expectations prevented some super°uous dialogs. In Figure 6, the risk of the optimizations is
revealed. In this case, 160 ticks have gone by without any progress being made because the
lifters did not see the situation in the same way that the hand-truck operator did. Except
for the delay, everything proceeds as it would have by ¯rst principles (the joint actions by
L1 and L2 starting in ticks 879, 1073, and 1126 are preceded by conversations that are not
shown).
5.1.4 Example: Learning to Interleave Goals
As mentioned previously, using execution traces as a basis for future coordinated plans allows
the actors to learn plans beyond the scope of the ¯rst-principles planner (or a traditional
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Ticks 77 to 111: <LOAD-TOGETHER PR34-XLBOX1 HANDTR3> by L1 and L2 successful
Ticks 162 to 181: <STAND-HANDTR HANDTR3 PR34-STREET1> by HTO1 successful
Ticks 217 to 237: L2 and L1 converse
"L1, would you help me achieve (HOLDING-TOGETHER PR34-XLBOX1)
via (UNLOAD-TOGETHER PR34-XLBOX1 HANDTR3)?
This is part of a plan involving you to achieve (ON PR34-XLBOX1 TRUCK3)."
"L2, sure! Lets get to it."
Ticks 238 to 272: <UNLOAD-TOGETHER PR34-XLBOX1 HANDTR3> by L1 and L2 successful
Ticks 273 to 290: L1 and L2 converse
"L2, would you help me achieve (ON PR34-XLBOX1 TRUCK3)
via (LOAD-TOGETHER PR34-XLBOX1 TRUCK3)?"
"L1, sure! Lets get to it."
Ticks 291 to 325: <LOAD-TOGETHER PR34-XLBOX1 TRUCK3> by L1 and L2 successful
Figure 5: Coordination based on implicit expectations: Same Goals.
second-order planner based on it). Another example shows how lifter L2 learns to interleave
two goals. This is an useful procedure to learn since it involves little idle time and is more
applicable than procedures involving more boxes. In this example, HTO1 and L1 will act as
in the ¯rst example, with the box in question now an extra-large box XLBOX1 rather than
MBOX3. The following are L2's plans and actions, starting four steps before HTO1 makes
her ¯rst request to L1.
1. L2 creates a typical plan to get XLBOX1 onto the truck: to lift, carry and load the
box jointly with L1. L1 agrees to lift the box together and they do so. L1 then agrees
to carry the box to the street. However, XLBOX1 is too large to carry, even jointly,
and the action (and hence rest of the plan) fails.
2. L2 creates a plan to get SBOX4 onto the truck. The plan consists of putting down
XLBOX1 with L1's help and then lifting, carrying and loading SBOX4 onto the truck
by herself. L2 is delayed in asking for L1's assistance because HTO1 calls ¯rst with a
request to put XLBOX1 onto HANDTR2. L1 agrees to help HTO1.
3. When L2 does ask L1 to help achieve HAND-EMPTY via putting XLBOX1 down
together, L1 replies that she would rather load the box together onto the hand-truck.
L2's planner adapts her current plan by replacing the PUT-DOWN-TOGETHER with
the appropriate LOAD-TOGETHER. The actors then load XLBOX1 onto the hand-
truck.
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Ticks 507 to 541: <LOAD-TOGETHER PR41-LBOX3 HANDTR3> by L1 and L2 successful
Ticks 613 to 632: <STAND-HANDTR HANDTR3 PR41-STREET1> by HTO1 successful
Tick 793: HTO1 became frustrated since WAIT-IMPLICIT not satisfied
Ticks 794 to 859: HTO1 and L2 converse
"L2, would you help me achieve (ON PR41-LBOX3 TRUCK3)?"
"HTO1, I'll help, but you'll have to wait a bit."
Ticks 879 to 908: <PUT-DOWN-TOGETHER PR41-XLBOX2 PR41-ROOM1> by L1 and L2 successful
Ticks 909 to 933: <MOVE PR41-STREET1> by L2 successful
Ticks 948 to 1026: L2 and L1 converse
"L1, would you help me achieve (HOLDING-TOGETHER PR41-LBOX3)
via (UNLOAD-TOGETHER PR41-LBOX3 HANDTR3)?
This is part of a plan involving you to achieve (ON PR41-LBOX3 TRUCK3)."
"L2, I'll help, but you'll have to wait a bit."
Tick 1020: HTO1 became frustrated since WAIT not satisfied
Ticks 1027 to 1039: HTO1 and L2 converse
"L2, I'm tired of waiting. Are you still working on (ON PR41-LBOX3 TRUCK3)?"
"HTO1, I'm still working on it. Chill out!"
Ticks 1027 to 1051: <MOVE PR41-STREET1> by L1 successful
Ticks 1073 to 1107: <UNLOAD-TOGETHER PR41-LBOX3 HANDTR3> by L1 and L2 successful
Ticks 1126 to 1160: <LOAD-TOGETHER PR41-LBOX3 TRUCK3> by L1 and L2 successful
Figure 6: Coordination based on implicit expectations: Di®erent Goals.
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L2 continues on with her plan and loads SBOX4 onto the truck. Meanwhile, HTO1
has pushed the hand-truck to the street and L1 has agreed to get XLBOX1 onto the
truck.
4. L2 constructs a plan to get large box LBOX2 onto the truck and moves back to ROOM1.
5. L2 is interrupted before attempting to lift LBOX2 by a request from L1 to help unload
XLBOX1 from the hand-truck. L2 constructs the plan of moving to the street and
then unloading XLBOX1. The actors do so.
6. L1 asks L2 to load XLBOX1 onto the truck and they do.
The sequence of actions L2 undertakes corresponds to six di®erent calls to the planner.
Nonetheless, L2 can extract a single coordinated procedure from her execution traces by the
machinery of procedural memory (showing the original literals instead of new variables for
clarity):
((LOAD-TOGETHER XLBOX1 HANDTR2)
(LOAD SBOX4 TRUCK1)
(LOAD-TOGETHER XLBOX1 TRUCK1))
5.2 Planning
MOVERS-WORLD presents a challenging planning domain. The challenge is not in han-
dling typical planning hurdles, such as deep search trees with large binding factors; rather,
MOVERS-WORLD actors must plan in an environment in which they have limited infor-
mation about, and control over, other actors and the world.
The independence of MOVERS-WORLD actors yields a rich variety of run-time behav-
iors. At any given point in time, an actor's knowledge of the external world is her perceivable
environment and a map of the world that she constructs as she goes along. Plans orient the
individual actor as to how to proceed (c.f., Suchman, 1987) but, because of uncertainty in
acting, plans are continuously being revised. Actors are assumed to be adaptive planners
(Alterman, 1988), so if the activity does not unfold as anticipated, the actor's plan will be
revised to re°ect the ongoing interaction between the actor and her environment. In gen-
eral, activity may not go as expected for a variety of reasons (bracketed numbers below give
average frequency counts for each type of event):
1. An actor may be interrupted by a request from another actor. In this case, the actors
have a conversation. During the conversation, actors may choose to suspend their cur-
rent goals and plan to accommodate a request [6.3 times per problem]. Alternatively,
an actor may have to abandon her current goals and plan because the other actor can
not or will not provide the needed assistance [7.8 times per problem].
2. An actor may attempt a primitive action which fails because of the actor's lack of
omniscience about the domain [14.1 times per problem].
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3. In some cases there may be a resource con°ict among actors, i.e. more than one actor
tries to manipulate the same object. Currently, the outcomes of these are decided at
random and the `losing' actors are delayed [3.7 times per problem].
4. Joint-actions are an all-or-nothing proposition. Unless all relevant actors participate,
those that intend to attempt the joint action are delayed [< 0.1 times per problem].
5. An actor's attempt to communicate with another actor may be delayed since the other
actor's communication channel may be busy or the other actor may be refusing to
answer (see Section 4.1) [18.9 times per problem].
For these reasons, actors will frequently have to adapt, replan, or suspend the current
activity. When a plan is completed or abandoned, the actor selects one or more of the unmet
top-level goals to actively work on. A plan is created for a set of goals by either selecting an
old plan from memory or creating a plan from scratch.
The adaptation of plans that are recalled from memory is the preferred method of plan-
ning. Old plans are stored somewhat abstractly so they require some re¯nement before they
are deployed. Our model di®ers from others in that extracts of execution traces, the result
of multiple planning sessions occurring at various times during the activity, are stored in
memory rather than the output of a single planning session, be it a plan (c.f., Fikes, Hart,
and Nilsson, 1972; Minton et. al. 1989; Kambhampati & Hendler, 1992) or a derivational
history (c.f., Carbonell, 1983; Veloso & Carbonell, 1993). Others have studied re-using plans
under other conditions (Hammond, 1990), including multiple actors (Suguwara, 1995).
An actor can also create a plan from scratch using a given set of STRIPS-like operators
(Fikes & Nilsson, 1971) in a hierarchical planner (c.f., Sacerdoti, 1974; Knoblock, 1990). The
situation calculus (McCarthy, 1958: 1968) is used to represent the planner's expectations
about changes in the situation that result from a given kind of action.
Each actor maintains a representation of the probability of success for di®erent actions in
di®erent contexts. When planning from scratch, the actor uses these probabilities to guide
it through the search space (c.f., Kushmerick, Hanks, and Weld, 1995). This information
represents some of the expectations the individual actor has about the capabilities of herself
and her co-participants. The probabilities are incrementally updated, so the actor develops
more realistic expectations during the course of action. The details of the MOVERS-WORLD
planning algorithm can be found in Garland (2000).
5.2.1 Probabilities
To get a feel for how estimating probabilities can help an actor behave e±ciently, consider a
common decision a lifter must make. A lifter can lift some boxes alone, but not all of them.
If a lifter can lift the box alone, it is more sensible to do so because they do not have to
spend time asking for assistance (and there is no guarantee the assistance will be given). On
the other hand, if there is little chance that the lifter can handle the box on her own, it is a
waste of time (and energy) to make the attempt. So, individuals should be able to recognize
which of these two possibilities is more likely and act accordingly.
In MOVERS-WORLD, successfully executing an action means that after the attempt has
been completed, all of the expected e®ects have occurred. The system determines whether
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actions succeed or not based upon a set of execution-time conditions unknown to the actor.
The domain features that determine whether actions are possible are object size, object
weight, actor strength, and item capacities. None of these are observable features of the
environment. Item capacities specify how many other items and how much total weight the
item can hold. The observable box features are height, width, depth and material - each
measured in integers between 0 and 3. For boxes, the size is derived from the volume of the
box and the weight is a linear function of the size and material. The label associated with a
box includes a S, M, L or XL solely in order to make it easier for the human reader to parse
the system output.
Initially, MOVERS-WORLD actors use probabilities of 50%. This steers an inexperienced
lifter to try to lift boxes alone because a plan to do so will be shorter (because there is no
communication needed) and thus appear more likely to succeed. So, at the beginning of a
problem, lifter L1 would try to pick up a large box LBOX1 by herself. L1 would fail; the
next time she wants to lift LBOX1, L1 will decide to ask for the help of another actor. This
decision is based upon L1's experience interacting with that particular box.
L1's experience interacting with a particular box will not prevent her from attempting
(and failing) to lift other large boxes alone. Tree structures provide a mechanism by which
MOVERS-WORLD actors generalize past run-time interaction experiences, saving time and
e®ort. The successes and failures of attempted actions are stored in a COBWEB (Fisher,
1987) tree associated with all of the observable features of the various role ¯llers for the
action. We assume that actions might fail for reasons not explicitly considered (c.f., the
quali¯cation problem: McCarthy, 1977), and COBWEB can handle this noisy data. Also,
COBWEB trees can be updated incrementally, which allows the actors to learn during the
course of their activity. If the observable characteristics (e.g., height, width, depth, texture)
of another box LBOX2 exactly match LBOX1, L1 will not attempt to lift LBOX2 alone. If
the features do not match exactly and there are other experiences stored in the tree, L1's
behavior depends on which experience the COBWEB classi¯cation algorithm considers the
best match with the current action.
DAEDALUS (Langley & Allen, 1991) included a learning mechanism that also relied upon
probabilities and COBWEB. DAEDALUS selects the operators (and partial role bindings)
based upon past planning histories in order to produce a plan in more situations. The most
prevalent technique for controlling behavior based on run-time interactions is reinforcement
learning techniques (Kaelbling, Littman, and Moore, 1996). Reinforcement learning has been
successfully applied in communication-free settings (Mataric, 1992; Sen, Sekaran, and Hale
1994; Sen and Sekaran 1998) and has even been used to learn a very simple communication
protocol (Yanco & Stein, 1993). Another approach to learning to control reactive behaviors
can be found in Stone & Veloso (1998).
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6 Experimental Analysis
As the members of the community of actors become familiar with the capabilities of other
members of the community and the regular problems of coordination that exist in their
domain of activity, behavioral conventions begin to emerge. As actors proceed through their
joint activities, expectations about behaviors of other actors are conditioned by remindings
of prior episodes of coordinated behavior. Situations are never exactly the same as prior
ones. Even with a growing sense that one knows how things will proceed, communication
and reasoning are needed to maintain coordination between participants as the joint activity
develops.
Statistics will be presented throughout this section that compare the performance of the
baseline system to the performance of the system when actors are learning conventions of
behaviors. By most measures, the baseline system improves over time because the actors'
planners produce plans that are more likely to succeed (due to improved probability esti-
mates). This baseline learning is signi¯cantly augmented by the addition of coordinated
procedures derived from previously successful joint activities. For short, in this section, we
will refer to this learning as `learning conventions' and the cumulative procedural knowledge
acquired by the community as `procedural memory'.
6.1 Methodology
The test-bed system is written in object-oriented Common Lisp and contains 30,000 lines
of source code, which produces 3MB of compiled code. The system solves both individual
MOVERS-WORLD problems and sequences of them. Individual problems are constructed by
randomly selecting subsets from the pool of permanent MOVERS-WORLD objects (actors,
hand-trucks, and trucks) that will be active for that problem. Then a random group of
boxes and locations is constructed and a list of goals involving them is generated. For these
experiments, a database was created of 60 problems, whose goals were always to move all
boxes to the truck. The number of boxes was uniformly distributed between 3 and 5.
The experiments are designed to control as many sources of randomness as possible
in order to make comparisons meaningful. In particular, community performance can be
strongly e®ected by the outcome of random decisions made by either the actor (e.g., selecting
unmet goals to work on) or the system (e.g., determining the outcome of resource con°icts).
The starting random seed value for each problem can be stored and reused, but since the
order in which the actors face these decisions may vary, this is not su±cient. In addition,
each randomly-decided decision point is stored together with a sequence of decisions. The
¯rst time the decision needs to be made, the ¯rst item in the list gives the result. The second
time the decision needs to be made (during the course of the same activity), the second item
gives the result, et cetera.
In addition to concerns about the in°uence of random decisions on the results of individual
problems, there are concerns about the the in°uence of problem ordering on the shapes of
learning curves. It is not feasible to determine learning curves by running the system on all
possible permutations of the database problems, so the system is run on seven predetermined
groups of sequences. Each group of sequences is balanced in the following way: each of the
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database problems occurs once as the ¯rst problem of some sequence in the group, once as
the second of a di®erent sequence in the group, et cetera. So each data point shown is the
result of solving each of the 60 database problems seven times, using di®erent sets of seeds
and decisions each time; these 420 runs were repeated for both the baseline system and when
the actors were learning conventions.
6.2 Overall Performance Characteristics
As the community of actors gets better at coordinating their behavior for regularly occur-
ring problems of coordination, one would expect to see some general improvements in the
performance of the community.
There are many ways to measure the performance of the community, such as the number
of primitive actions attempted and the number conversations that occur. The best overall
measure of community e®ort, however, is the number of ticks that transpire during the course
of the community solving the problem. This measure of simulated time includes both action
and communication e®ort, in addition to time when the actors are idle for one reason or
another. For example, an actor will idle (technically, they execute a NO-OP) because their
planner has failed to generate a plan [the number of times this occurs, averaged over the 420
runs, ranges from 1.9 to 3.7 times per problem].
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Figure 7: Overall community performance improves.
Figure 7 shows improvements in group performance with and without actors learning
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from prior experience of coordinated behavior. The 99% con¯dence interval for each data
point is displayed as well. The average number of ticks required to solve these problems
before learning conventions was 1026.4, with a standard error of 18.5. Even without proce-
dural memory, there is improvement in group performance; these improvements result from
increasingly accurate probability estimates. The addition of procedural memory leads to
signi¯cant improvement; the average number of ticks drops fairly steadily, ending at 638.1,
a 26.4% improvement over the baseline system. Improvement along each curve after the
fourth problem-solving episode were not statistically signi¯cant, but they do suggest that
the community continues to modestly improve at the task.
Overall system performance of an AI system is often measured by CPU usage. However,
CPU usage is an inappropriate measure of community performance in our domain because
we are primarily interested in improving the community's runtime behavior, not the speed
at which they plan (or retrieve plans from memory).1
6.3 Primitive Actions
Figure 8 shows that the improved runtime performance of the community is a direct result of
the fact that the planner produces plans that are either more e±cient (e.g., interleaves goals),
more likely to be successful, or both. The left side of the ¯gure tracks the number of actions
attempted (whether successful or not) by the actors over the course of solving a problem.
The right side focuses on just the number of successful actions. Learning conventions leads
to signi¯cantly fewer actions, both attempted and successful. Standard deviations for all
points shown are less than 0.82 and, again, there is no statistically signi¯cant decrease along
the tail of the curves.
By focusing on the performance of the baseline system, we can see that, over time,
the improved probability estimates lead the individual actor to produce plans that require
fewer attempted actions. However, this is not translated into a reduction in the number of
successful actions needed to solve the problems. So the reduction in the number of ticks for
the baseline system re°ects the fact that actors ¯nd the appropriate kinds of ¯rst-principles
plans earlier in the course of the activity. On the other hand, procedural memory allows the
actors to solve the problems using fewer successful actions. Clearly, the actors are guided by
higher caliber plans.
Figure 8 takes a macroscopic view, measuring the action e®ort of the community to solve
the entire set of top-level goals. Alternatively, we can myopically measure how e±ciently
the actors are solving each top-level goal in isolation. For a given goal, we can compute
the number of actions, either attempted or successful, that the actors undertook to achieve
the goal. This can be compared to the fewest possible given the initial con¯guration of the
problem. For example, a small, clear box inside the house requires a minimum of three
actions to get it onto the truck: LIFT, CARRY and LOAD. Then, for all problems and all
common top-level goals, the frequency with which the community undertakes the minimal
number of actions can be computed. The results are given in Figure 9. With procedural
memory, the actors in MOVERS-WORLD are attempting the minimal number of actions
1This disclaimer does not hide an ugly result { CPU time is less when actors learn conventions.
33      
Attempted Actions
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
/
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
Problem Solving Episode Number
             
Learning Conventions
Baseline System
Successful Actions
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
/
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
Problem Solving Episode Number
             
Learning Conventions
Baseline System
Figure 8: The number of primitive actions is decreasing.
more frequently (80:2% of the time) than in the baseline system (65:3% of the time). The
actors also solved problems using the minimal number of successful actions more frequently
when they learned conventions.
6.4 Communication
Figure 10 shows that learning conventions in MOVERS-WORLD reduces the amount of
runtime communication. As individual actors get better at guessing what kinds of joint
activities work and how they will unfold, the amount of runtime communication needed to
achieve their joint goals is decreasing.
This re°ects possibly two things: the number of requests is decreasing and/or the per-
centage of agreed-to requests are increasing. The number of requests is decreasing either
because actors are making fewer requests that are rejected, or because the actors are able to
anticipate a request or action on the part of another actor without having to directly com-
municate. Our experimental data shows that by the tenth problem solving episode, with the
use of procedural memory, the number of requests from one actor to another has decreased
but the percentage of agreed-to requests has increased, i.e.,
Requests Percentage agreed-to
Initial behavior 19.6 73.7
Baseline system 17.4 62.7
Learning conventions 8.7 77.9
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Figure 9: Approaching minimal action e®ort.
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Figure 10: Community communication decreases.
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6.5 Planning
A natural question to ask is whether the improvement in runtime performance comes at
a high price in increased planner e®ort. The data show (see Figure 11) that there is a
decrease in the amount of search e®ort the planner requires in order to instantiate local role-
binding variables. There is also a dramatic reduction in the number of planning search nodes
expanded during calls to the planner, both compared to the initial behavior and the baseline
learning system. In other words, the development of conventions is a `win-win' situation.
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Figure 11: Planning e®ort decreases when actors learn conventions.
6.6 How is Memory for Prior Coordinated Activity Improving
Performance?
The analysis presented so far con¯rms that the participants are getting better at coordinating
their behavior when learning conventions. Several measures of external behavior re°ect
improvement. Overall communication and action e®ort are reduced; actors attempt and
succeed at ¯nding the optimal solution for moving an individual box more frequently; and the
number of requests between actors is decreasing, while the percentage of agreed-to requests
is increasing.
Why is the external behavior of the community improving? Our results show that learning
conventions improves performance by predisposing actors to approach the problems in related
ways.
We track conversations in order to measure when two actors are assessing a situation in
related ways. One indication the two actors are assessing the situation in similar manners is
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that the listener is already working on the same goals as the requester. A stronger indication
is when the listener is both working on the same goals and the listener's plan already includes
a coordination point corresponding to the request. More technically, the listener's plan is
considered related to the incoming request if any of the following are true:
1. The incoming request is a request for a service to be provided and the plan contains
either:
(a) Communication about the same request; or
(b) A wait operator for the same request.
2. The incoming request is a request for a joint action and the plan contains either:
(a) Communication about the same action; or
(b) A wait operator for the same action; or
(c) The same action.
The ideal situation would be that when one actor makes a request of another, the two actors
always are working on the same goals and have plans containing the same coordination
points.
Figure 12 measures how frequently two conversing actors have similar assessments of the
situation. The left hand side of the ¯gure measures the performance for the baseline system.
For 66% of the requests, the listener has the same goals and 30% of the time she has a related
plan. The right hand side of the ¯gure measures performance when the actors use their
memory of prior coordinated behavior to inform their activity. Here we see improvements
in both statistics. More signi¯cantly, the curves are converging. In other words, the actors
are learning to assess the same situation in a compatible manners by extracting plans with
related points of coordination to accomplish the same goals.
Despite the fact that actors are converging on individual coordination points, they do
not converge on an identical mental structure for representing conventional behavior. We
measured the overlap in the mental structures of independent actors in two ways. One way
compares pairs of case-base entries from di®erent actors to see how frequently they have the
same plan. This entails having the same number of actions, each of which has the same
action description (modulo the internal variable names). Because of their di®ering operator
sets, lifters and hand-truck operators never have the same plan. Even two lifters do not
converge on the same plan: less than 11% of the plans in memory are isomorphic. A stricter
measure, which requires that the entries are stored under the same contextual indices, never
breaks 3.2%.
6.7 E®ect of optimizations
To demonstrate that the results in the section are not dependent on the optimizations that
MOVERS-WORLD actors perform, we re-ran the system without them. Figure 13 shows
how two performance measures compare. Learning is faster and performance slightly better
when the optimizations are performed, but there is not a great deal of di®erence. Other
statistics show similar relationships. Thus, the credit for the improvement in community
performance lies primarily with remembering in general and not with the optimizations.
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Figure 12: Measuring how conventions lead to related approaches.
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Figure 13: Measuring the impact of optimizations on ticks and conversations.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Combining Two Views of Cognition
Within Cognitive Science, a framework for the study of cognition that integrates social
theories of cognition with cognitive science models of human information processing has been
explicitly advocated by Hutchins (1995b) and Greeno (1998). Hutchins (1995a:1995b:1993)
argues that cognition is distributed among the artifacts and individuals who participate
in culturally and historically conditioned ongoing practices. These larger socio-technical
systems have cognitive properties that cannot be reduced to the cognitive properties of
individual persons. This larger unit of analysis provides a basis for the study of cognition
(Hutchins, 1995b; p. 266):
In this paper, I will attempt to show that the classical cognitive science approach
can be applied with little modi¯cation to a unit of analysis that is larger than a
person. One can still ask the same questions of a larger, socio-technical system
that one would ask of an individual. That is, we wish to characterize the behav-
ioral properties of the unit of analysis in terms of the structure and the processing
of presentations that are internal to the system. With the new unit of analysis
many of the representations can be observed directly, so in some respects, this
may be a much easier task than trying to determine the processes internal to the
individual that account for the individual's behavior. Posing questions in this
way reveals how systems that are larger than an individual may have cognitive
properties in their own right that cannot be reduced to the cognitive properties
of individual persons.
If the unit of analysis is a single individual, cognitive scientists can only infer internal states
of the actor from external behaviors, while with larger systems it is possible to directly
observe some of the internal states of the the larger system.
Greeno (1998) advocates a program for research that combines standard cognitive science
with the research and methods of work on situated activity that have come out of the social
sciences. For Greeno, the key is to analyze information structures in socially organized
activities (p. 6):
Although these lines of research | the study of individual cognition and
of socially organized interaction | both provide important scienti¯c knowledge
and understanding, they have developed in relative isolation from each other.
Cognitive science analyzes structures of the informational contents of activity,
but has little to say about the mutual interactions that people have with each
other and with the material and technological resources of their environments.
Interaction studies analyze patterns of coordination of activity but have little to
say about the informational contents of interaction that are involved in achieving
task goals and functions.
Greeno recommends that both cognitive science and situative strategies of research be in-
vestigated `vigorously'.
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The computational model of conventional behaviors that is developed in this paper ¯ts
into Greeno's proposed program of research. It details the cognition of individual members
of a community of actors participating in joint activities. Individuals push through joint
activities by relying on their memories of prior activities. Over time, conventions of behavior
in joint activities begin to develop. But these conventions of behavior emerge only during
the course of activity and are subject to the constraints of the larger context.
From the perspective of individual psychology, the computational model presented in
the paper depicted everyday reasoning about conventional behavior and joint activity as
a memory-based process tied to pragmatic action. The expectation that certain points of
coordination would develop during the course of action framed the individuals reasoning
about joint behavior. From the perspective of the distribution of cognition, the computa-
tional model showed how the social interaction circumscribed and simpli¯ed the reasoning
processes.
In general, a computational model is a description of cognitive processes and not a demon-
strative simulation (Greeno & Moore, 1993: p. 56). Two issues will su±ce to illustrate this
point. One issue concerns the selection of mechanisms to use for modeling the reasoning of
the individual actor. For example, early Arti¯cial Intelligence methods used explicit struc-
tural representations (e.g., frames: Minsky, 1975) and semantic networks (Quillian, 1968)
for depicting schemata (Bartlett, 1932) as a part of memory. Within the parallel distributed
processing movement (see Rumelhart & McCelland, 1986), the representation of the struc-
ture of memory became more distributed and moved closer to approximating what is known
about how networks of neurons within the brain `compute'. For the cognitive modeler, the
trade-o® between using one or the other machinery as a part of his/her model is compli-
cated. Neural nets may better approximate how the brain works, but as a practical matter,
the current implementations of neural network computation are better for modeling low level
perception than they are for characterizing larger fragments of phenomena such as everyday
activity. The computational modeler can use explicit structural representations or rules for
this purpose, but the caveat is that relevant features of the structured representations and
rules must be eventually replaced by models that better approximate the brain activity. One
could try to advocate a position that all high level theorizing is irrelevant to the eventual
brain theory of behavior that will emerge, but it is hard to understand the force of this argu-
ment. In general, it is well understood that top-down ¯ltering is a powerful problem-solving
tool. In the case of combining the top-down theories of cognitive science and the situative
view of cognition with the brain theories of the neuroscience community, evidence fails to
support a radical neuron doctrine that would discount modeling from the top-down (Gold
& Stoljar, 1999).
Another sticky issue concerns the level at which to analyze and represent the phenomena.
The MW model represents the activities of the participants at a fairly course grain. Take a
joint action like CARRY-TOGETHER. Actors can, and do, reason about their activity at
that level. A ¯ner grain analysis would feature the reasoning that is done as the carrying
together unfolds. How is the path determined and how are obstructions managed? What
happens when one (or both) of the actors needs to change her grip? How does the passage
through a doorway proceed? At this ¯ner grain level of analysis, there are continual adjust-
ments that are made by the participants in order to wend their way through the activity. The
decision to model at one level or another re°ects a con°uence of issues. A critical factor is
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that each ¯ner grain level of analysis introduces additional complexity to the computational
model. The level at which MW was modeled entailed the production of 30;000 lines of LISP
source code. An even ¯ner grain analysis would have required larger amounts of code, and
there is no reason to believe that the increase in code would have been linear rather than
exponential. For example, at any granularity of analysis for the MW domain, one could talk
about the mental parts and the action parts. It is a hotly disputed issues whether they are in
fact separable. The di®erences of opinion pivot over claims about internal representations,
interaction, and emergence. Some of these issues are addressed in the MW model, others
are not. A ¯ner grain analysis would have forced a careful examination of the constella-
tion of issues concerning internal representations, a®ordances, and perception (e.g., Clancey,
1993), but the resulting additional complexity in the modeling task would have prevented a
summation on the point of convention.
Each re¯nement in the analysis introduces additional complexity in the programming
task. Consequently, the computational modeler, at some point, needs to decide which issues
should be pursued and to what depth. One way to think about a computational cognitive
model is that it is a summary with an `attitude'. It is a summary because there is too much
ground to cover. It has an attitude because the model that is produced is an interpretation
and characterization of the relevant phenomena.
A ¯nal point about cognitive modeling concerns its relation to Arti¯cial Intelligence (AI)
programs. At one point the framework for the study of AI was assumed to be cognitive.
Nowadays, the relationship between AI and Cognitive Science is somewhat more compli-
cated. Not all human methods are optimal methods for computers. Not all AI programs
are cognitive models (e.g., Deep Blue). The AI researcher wants to achieve engineering suc-
cesses, and the computational cognitive modeler wants to depict the relevant aspects of the
experimental and ethnographic evidence available. An extended project can include parts
that are either AI or Cognitive, and the arguments for each kind of feature di®er. Never-
theless there can be confusions and con°icts between the system as a model that re°ects
results and data from the interdisciplinary communities and the system as a solution to an
engineering problem.
There are a lot of cognitive constraints on how such a model could be put together, and
each constraint introduces new complexity into the programming task. The more we pay
attention to the cognitive constraints, the harder it is to build the model, as the constraints
work to rule out many simplifying or closed-world assumptions or programming decisions.
Every time you give up a closed-world assumption and replace it with a story that is based
on psychological experimentation or ethnographic study, the models gets harder to build.
One can engineer a solution to ¯nd the optimal solution to a given closed-world assumption
(the AI problem), but for the cognitive scientist the task is to model the relevant phenomena
in a manner consistent with existing interdisciplinary data and theory.
7.2 Where and When Do Conventions Exist?
In MOVERS-WORLD, memory is organized around points of coordination within the progress
of a joint activity. This principal of organization assumes that individual actors are trying
to converge on an ideal structure for the activity. The analysis of the data shows that with
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the addition of this expectation (not its completion), reductions in the number of primitive
actions taken, communication costs, and plan e®ort are all achieved as the overall perfor-
mance of the community continues to improve. Section 6 shows that, given this principal
of organization, the machinery of individual memory can convert raw common experiences
into improvements in the performance of joint behavior. The analysis of the experimental
data of MW does not, however, provide evidence that there ever exists a unique or ideal
point of convergence in the mind of each of the participants (see Section 6.6). Each memory
provides an orientation, a set of expectations, about how the current activity could proceed.
Some recollections may be better than others, but none of the individual memories have any
special status. In other words, improvements in coordination for practiced joint activities are
achieved, even though no ideal or unique script for a conventional behavior is determined.
Perhaps a unique idealization of a conventional behavior exists in an external representa-
tion. For example, in the usage of an air telephone there exists, in the form of instructions, an
external representation of the conventional behaviors that the individual actor must produce
in order to use the device. Considerable work is necessary to achieve the behavior dictated by
the instructions (Suchman, 1987; Agre & Chapman, 1990). An icon of a credit card informs
the air telephone user of the method of payment, but to achieve the conventional behavior
of inserting the credit card so it can be read necessitates a great deal of work (Alterman,
Zito-Wolf, and Carpenter 1991:1998).
Reconsider the case of Dick and Jane coordinating their e®orts in order to achieve joint
passage through a doorway. What the model suggests is that as Dick and Jane continue to
practice their joint activity, they both have the expectation that an ideal and unique script
for the convention will eventually emerge. Because the recall of prior joint activities orients
future behaviors, the expectation of conventional behavior shapes performance. Nevertheless,
as independent actors, Dick and Jane do not converge on an ideal script; e®ective performance
will continue to require online adjustments and cooperation in order to keep on-track and
in-synch. Even if the wheelchair came with a set of instructions that describe a conventional
behavior for one person to aid a second person in a wheelchair at passing through a closed
doorway, it would still require considerable work on Dick and Jane's part to achieve their
common goal.
To recapitulate, there is no ideal internal script that represents the convention. An exter-
nal representation of the conventional behavior requires work, cooperation, and coordination
of e®ort. Whatever structure for the conventional behavior that exists prior to the joint ac-
tivity at best approximates a behavior of convention. But then where, or perhaps when, is
the convention?
Research studies in ethnomethodology (Gar¯nkel, 1967) and situated activity (Suchman,
1987; Lave, 1988; Agre, 1997) report that the structure for activity is, in part, a product
of the activity. Perhaps this is also the case for behaviors that are conventional, i.e., the
structure of convention is at least partially a product of activity. In the case of Dick and
Jane, there is no analysis that will anticipate the coincidence of details that confront them as
they wend their way through the activity. By means of a program of combining expectations
with the speci¯cs of the situation that confronts them, Dick and Jane are able to coordinate
their behavior. Although there are prior structures for the activity that informs participant
behavior, additional structure arises during the course of the activity.
An example of a structure that could emerge during a joint activity is a shared plan
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(Grosz & Sidner, 1990). From the perspective of collaboration, each occasion of joint activity
is managed through the ongoing construction of a shared plan (Grosz & Kraus, 1996; Grosz
& Kraus, 1999). Shared plans may be partial and can be revised as the activity continues.
For a group of collaborators to have a full shared plan there must be a mutual belief that
they are committed to the success of the collaboration and a mutual belief of the need to
accomplish each of the subactions upon which it depends. A key idea is that even when they
only have a partial shared plan to achieve a given subaction | collaborators only partially
know what they are going to do | they always have a full shared plan to work out the
details of the partial shared plan. A unique shared plan is constructed on each occasion of
joint activity.
Not all conventional activities are collaborations. When crossing the street at busy
intersection in San Francisco, pedestrians are moving in both directions, they must cross
the street in the allotted time while avoiding bumping into each other and staying within
the crosswalk. There are conventions for these kinds of activity, but it would be odd to
claim the participants were either collaborating or had a shared plan. Where collaborations
are occurring, the structure of the conventional behavior bears some relation to a shared
plan. When Ed and Joan start living together they have not worked out a convention for
cleaning house before company comes over, but over time they might. If there is a shared
plan for the nth time they perform this activity, there was also one for the ¯rst time they
did it. This points to the critical di®erence between a shared plan and a convention. A
shared plan is a construct that is tied to a single episode of joint activity. A convention is
a construct that is tied to the history of related joint activities; it develops with a social
practice. In other words, if the unit of measure is a single episode of joint activity, the
shared plan is a synchronic analysis of the behavior of the participants and conventions are
a diachronic one. Convention is measured by a reduction in the amount of work needed
by participants in a joint activity to achieve a common goal. Over time, through practice
at working at a recurring problem of coordination, certain points of coordination become
expected, a design for the activity develops, and a convention becomes a part of the initial
common ground. The emergence of convention coincides with the development over time of
a home task environment for coordinating behaviors. A shared plan realizes a conventional
behavior only after a community of actors have worked together, over many episodes of
joint activity, to achieve a given goal in a given context. The shared plan re°ects the work
participants do in performing a behavioral convention on a given occasion, but the same
convention may be invoked by di®erent shared plans on di®erent occasions.
To summarize: When do conventions exist? They exist after a community of actors have
had the opportunity to interact for awhile. Where do conventions exist? They exist in the
predisposition of individual actors that develops from their shared practice and is contingent
on historically conditioned constraints and a®ordances of their shared task environment.
7.3 Everyday Reasoning
The coordination of joint activity is the key to everyday behavior, and reasoning about
coordination is the task of everyday reasoning.
One possibility is that \everyday reasoning" is another form of analytic/scienti¯c rea-
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soning. Scienti¯c reasoners do collaborate, and it improves their performance. Okada &
Simon (1997) model two students engaged in a collaborative scienti¯c discovery task. Their
evidence argues that the collaborative unit A & B performs on average better than A or B
working individually. Their model of the data shows that (p. 139) \A partner's questions,
requests, critiques toward one's hypothesis and/or justi¯cation enhance further search in the
hypothesis space and the experiment space." They do not, however, model how the students
stay coordinated during their collaboration. Whose turn is it to speak? What does my
co-participant mean when she points to the ¯gure on the paper and speaks the words ....?
At this level, the discovery collaboration is \An iterative cycle of displaying, con¯rming,
and repairing situation actions" (Roschelle 1992: p. 237). Is a locally and interactionally
managed form of group decision-making that is administered by the participants during their
collaboration (Sachs, Scheglo®, and Je®erson,1974) the same thing as a scienti¯c reasoning?
Are the discovery participants managing their interaction using scienti¯c reasoning?
With scienti¯c and analytic reasoning, the task is to build an abstract model that char-
acterizes a given set of phenomena (data). Both analytic reasoning and scienti¯c reasoning
are modeled in cognitive science as heuristic search (VanLehn, 1989). Pure analysis (solving
puzzles, doing proofs) is heuristic search (Newell & Simon, 1972) and the assumption is that
an analytic solution exists to achieve a goal state. The scienti¯c reasoner searches the space
of possible models to ¯nd a good ¯t for the relevant data; the problem is to construct a
single consistent model that covers all the relevant data and only the relevant data.
With everyday activity, the goal state has a feature of arbitrariness. Analysis will take
the individual only so far. Whatever `analysis' the individual makes about the predicament
in which she ¯nds herself falls short of uniquely determining the course of joint action. While
Dick and Jane are achieving coordination as they move through the doorway, there are points
at which they cannot predict with su±cient certainty | the coordination points | what
the other will do. And they need to, or the joint action will fail. And that is the problem of
\everyday reasoning."
There is no way to analytically determine what convention is in play. One cannot guess
what the other participants are going to do, and there is no way to proceed unless you do.
So the participants signal back and forth to stay on course, righting themselves with even
more social interaction when breakdowns in coordination occur. It is the interactive part
| the social part | that drives the system. The best that the individual actor can hope
for is getting better at expecting certain points of coordination to occur. A given is that
the expectations of co-participants will di®er. No doubt heuristic search is also occurring to
prepare for the interaction, but it is also greatly circumscribed and reduced by the social
interaction. For another discussion of everyday reasoning versus analytic reasoning, see
Alterman (1999).
7.4 Are Two Minds Reducible to One?
What is the practicing cognitive scientist to make of social theories of cognition? The
tradition in Cognitive Science has been to choose a single mind working alone as the basic
unit of analysis. The skeptical cognitive scientist might agree that there are social, cultural,
historic, and interactionist aspects to everyday reasoning about the coordination of activity,
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but argue that the analysis can be framed in terms of the inner working of the individual
mind. If one could show that the social level is decomposable into lower levels that involved
the reasoning of one mind, then the case would be made. Can it be shown that two minds
are reducible to one?
For the sake of argument, suppose the world can be divided into two parts: an outside and
an inside. Outside is the external world and the task environment, and inside is a symbolic
representation of the relevant aspects of the task environment. Cognition works inside a
closed room from internal representations, analyzing their structure, rationally constructing
plans for future behaviors; it is framed as heuristic search in a problem space representation
of the external world. Cognition and behavior function like a sewing machine: inside is
cognition; outside is behavior; inside is structure; outside is action. Over repeated cycles,
behavior takes shape, but the intelligence in the behavior is only occurring within the closed
room \sandwiched" in-between moments of contact with the external world.
If two minds are reducible to one, then the structure of behavior is only inside or, at
a minimum, the creation of structure depends only on what's inside. Is structure only
inside? No, structure is both inside (e.g., a plan) and outside (e.g., instructions). Does
all the structure of behavior originate from the inside? Or does some of it require a social
interaction to initiate creation? One could argue that the structural elements of language
(Chomsky, 1980) and thought (Fodor, 1983) are rooted in the biological. One could also
argue over whether external structure at one point or another has an internal form (see
Cognitive Science, 1993). But both of these are beside the point. The issue here pivots over
whether there exists structure for behavior whose creation depends on a social interaction.
If none exist, then two minds are reducible to one.
As we have shown in this paper, in the case of joint activities and conventional behaviors,
some of the structure of behavior clearly originates from the social interaction. The partici-
pants work to stay coordinated in order to simplify and improve performance. The way they
stay coordinated is to exchange information about their expectations about the structure
of their joint behavior. When Dick and Jane engage in a joint activity, whatever predis-
positions exist, in the form of expected point of coordination, only abstractly characterize
the structure of their joint behavior. Additional structure for the behavior (the collection
of these exchanges of information) emerges from their joint activity, and these are external
representations. The participants co-construct a design for conventional behaviors. The
design that emerges exists only as a product of social interaction; it does not exist without
the interaction.
Even in the case of individual actions that do not directly involve other actors, the
structure for the activity partially originates in an external structure that was provided by
another actor, or the same actor at earlier time.
Most | all? | individual behaviors are mediated by tools and external signs. Learning to
do new activities depends on instruction. Instruction can come from many sources: another
person, written instruction, or design of the task environment. All of these, either directly or
indirectly, depend on input from another person who is already familiar with the structure of
the activity. This dynamic is the basis of cultural history and learning (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978;
Cole, 1996). Examples of models of cultural learning that depend on a social interaction
include: Hutchins (1995a), Lave & Wenger (1991), Alterman, Zito-Wolf, and Carpenter
(1998), and Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993).
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Even when one's behavior in using a given mediating artifact has become more routine, it
is still dependent on the design of the task environment, which is an external representation
provided by another actor. Take an action like \dialing" a number on a cordless touchtone
phone. The individual actor may know the number she is going to dial and she knows she
will grip the phone in her right hand and press the telephone number buttons using her
right thumb. So, some of the structure of her behavior is internal. But clearly not all. She
may know the layout of the touchpad, but her hand will be positioned di®erently on each
occasion, so some of the structure of her behavior, the control of the \dialing" is structured
by visual information available as she performs the act. It is the uncertainty of the relation
of the hand to the cordless phone, as she holds it, that makes a strategy of using external
representations available in the task environment to guide behavior advisable. Another way
to state this advantage is that distributing the structure of the behavior between the design
of the task environment and the internalized procedures of the individual make everyday
reasoning about behavior more reliable and robust.
Learning and uncertainty are two reasons that the structure of behavior can originate in
the external. The reliability of memory is a third.
Two performance characteristics of long term human memory are retention and accessibil-
ity. The retention of information in long term memory takes practice. Even for information
that is retained, recall may be slow or fail. During the °ow of activity, any slow down or
failure to recall relevant information can cause breakdowns. Associating controls with burn-
ers, is easy to do for someone who regularly cooks at home, but that information is easily
con¯rmed and more readily accessible, if the actor looks at the labeling of the controls as
she proceeds with her activity. But again, that means reasoning about everyday behavior is
dependent on external representations of the structure of the requisite behavior | without
them the behavior will continuously break down. One could argue that before the individ-
ual acts, the relevant design information is encoded within an internal representation. But
that misses an important point, which is that the re-representation within the mind of the
individual is a derivative of the external representation provided by another actor.
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8 Concluding Remarks
Re-using and extending conventional methods for coordinating behavior is the task of every-
day reasoning and the subject of this paper. The framework we developed combines social
theories of cognition with human information processing models that have been developed
within Cognitive Science.
From the perspective of a social theory of cognition:
² The social interaction among participants circumscribes and simpli¯es the reasoning
processes. The participants agree to points of coordination as they proceed. The
historic elements of the social interaction between actors within a community cannot
be factored out of the analysis of conventional behavior.
From the perspective of individual psychology:
² Reasoning about everyday joint behavior is a memory-based process tied to pragmatic
action. The predisposition for certain points of coordination to develop during the
course of activity, and the assumption that other actors will share those predispositions,
frame the individual's behavior.
Conventional behaviors develop as a part of the social practice within a community
of actors and are partially emergent. Di®erent actors bring to bear di®erent expectations,
knowledge, and experience. As the actors proceed with their joint activities, gaps in behavior
are ¯lled in by reasoning about historically conditioned constraints, a®ordances, and patterns
of coordination. During the give-and-take of activity, participants reason with a bias that
at one point or another their expectations about points of coordination will be met. There
is also the understanding that because of uncertainty, interruptions, and numerous other
opportunities to get o®-track and out-of-synch, the participants must work continuously and
jointly to achieve conventional coordination. The expected points of coordination collectively
form a design for the activity, but not a complete speci¯cation of structure of the convention
activity, which emerges uniquely on each occasion of recurrent activity.
The computational model we presented details the emergence of convention in circum-
stances where there is no ruling body of knowledge developed by prior generations of actors
within the community to guide behavior. The example domain is a group of actors who are
part of a moving company. Their job is to move boxes from a house into a truck. With prac-
tice, individuals within the community begin to converge on a set of conventions for behavior
that match the regularly occurring problems of coordination in the domain of activity. One
feature of the model is that the mechanisms for improving behavior are tied to the memory
function of individual actors. Another important feature of the model is that the commu-
nity improves its performance despite the fact that individuals reason independently about
their experiences. A large set of computational experiments were conducted. The empiri-
cal evidence supports the theoretical position that was developed on conventional behavior.
Convention is measured as the reduction in the amount of work needed by participants in
a joint activity to achieve common goals. The development of convention reduces commu-
nication, planning costs, and the number of primitive actions needed to achieve common
goals. There is no unique internal structure in the mind of all participants that represents a
conventional behavior.
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